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Abstract 
 
Title:  Changes in investment and financing policies during the financial crisis in 
Northern Europe 
Seminar date:  2014-06-03 
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Purpose:  The main purpose of this thesis is to investigate the financial crisis effects on 
financing- and investment activities by researching the changes in capital 
expenditures, net debt issuance, equity issuance and cash holdings in the light 
of demand and supply shock theories.. 
Theory:  The theoretical framework is based on the follwingg theories; Bank lending 
supply shock, Credit supply shock, Demand shock of services and goods, 
Amplification mechanism 
Methodology: Difference-in-Difference and Abadie and Imbens matching estimator method is 
conducted in order to study the changes in our dependent variables.   
Empirical  The study includes 591 firms listed on Nasdax OMX Nordic, ODAX and  
Foundation:  FTSE under the last financial crisis. 
Conclusion:  The thesis support the credit supply shock theory that high leverage firms were 
more affected and high cash firms less affected, contradicts bank-lending shock 
theory by indicating that bank-dependent firms were less affected 
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1. Introduction 
The first chapter will provide a background of the financial crisis which will lead up to a 
problem discussion of the impacts the financing supply shocks had on firm’s investment 
activities. This sets the foundation of the thesis. This is further narrowed down to a statement of 
purpose and research questions followed by delimitations. 
1.1 Background 
The financial crisis of 2007 and 2008, following the burst of the housing bubble in US, was the 
largest financial turmoil since the Great Depression. The crisis affected firms’ ability to get 
financing, which is one of the key determinants of the investment activities. If a firm cannot 
finance its investment plans, it cannot proceed with the investments. To understand the depth of 
the crisis, it is important to understand the causes behind it. The years leading up to the crisis can 
be described as a low interest rate environment where capital inflows from Asian countries and 
lax interest rates policy pushed down the interest rate. The Asian countries used US securities to 
fix their exchange rate and hedge against a depreciation of their own currencies, a lesson from 
the late 1990s Southeast Asian crisis. The Federal Reserve Bank promoted the low interests and 
therefore did not restrain the raise of the housing bubble due to fears of deflation following the 
Internet bubble. The cheap debt financing allowed firms and individuals to purchase assets to a 
greater extent than compared to more normal times. (Brunnermeier, 2009)  
Another factor in the build-up of the crisis is the innovation and transformation within the 
banking system. The traditional banking model got replaced by a new model where banks 
through securitization pooled, tranched and resold their issued loans. These structured finance 
securities such as collateralized debt obligations (CDO’s) and mortgage backed securities 
(MBS’s) were then resold to investors that supposedly were the best at handle the risk. But the 
statistical models underestimated the default risk on mortgages, since declining house prices 
were largely a regional phenomenon, where the US had not experienced a national decline in 
home prices since World War II. (Coval, Jurek and Stafford, 2009) To further enhance the 
creditworthiness of the structured finance securities, investors bought Credit Default Swaps 
(CDS) to offset the risk of default. This created a new demand for issuing of loans, where the 
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lending standards declined, resulting in lending to a new category of people who previously had 
too low credit scores to be granted loans. (Benmelech & Dlugosz, 2009; Demyanyk & van 
Hemert, 2008; Keys, Mukherjee, Seru and Vig, 2010) This facilitated tripled home prices 
between 1995 and 2006, but then prices fell roughly 30 % between 2007 and 2009 (Case, 2008; 
Mayer, Pence and Sherlund, 2009). The resold loans often ended up in the ownership of an 
investment bank, meaning that large parts of the credit risk actually never left the banking system 
(Duffie, 2008). Structured finance securities were often used by banks to overcome restricting 
capital regulations such as Basel I and Basel II (Brunnermeier, 2009). 
A third factor behind the crisis was the trend towards financing with shorter maturities, which is 
cheaper because investors prefered shorter maturities and thus put a smaller maturity premium 
on shorter maturities (Bryant, 1980; Diamond & Dybvig, 1983; Allen & Gale, 2007). The off-
balance-sheet investment vehicles, which were used when creating other CDO’s, used financing 
with a maturity rate of an average of 90 days. This created a funding liquidity risk when 
investors suddenly stop financing. The new banking system and the low interest rate 
environment, facilitated the extensive lending and fuelled the housing bubble, and also the trend 
towards shorter maturities made the financial system more sensitive to shocks. In February of 
2007, following a decline in housing prices, an increase of defaults of subprime mortgage took 
place. Furthermore in May of the same year UBS shut down the hedge fund Dillon, following the 
loss of $125 million. This lead rating firms to reviews and downgrade subprime securities, and 
later to problems for Bear Stearns and Countrywide Financial Corp. As the crisis unfolded, a 
large numbers of financial institutes around the world were in bankruptcy or near bankruptcy. As 
the uncertainty and losses spread through the financial system the liquidity in the financial 
market froze and a large contraction of debt issuance began. These lead to consequences where 
even the largest and well reputed had problems acquiring the financing they required. 
(Brunnermeier, 2009; Gorton, 2010; Acharya, Philippon, Richardson & Roubini (2009) 
1.2 Problem Discussion 
Firm’s access to financing, with bank loans, credits, equity were all key determinants in the 
firm’s investment activities, but also internal financing such as cash holdings played a major 
part. The financial crisis largely reduced firm’s access to the financial markets, which was costly 
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if a firm could not pursue investments with positive net present value. A firm’s access to 
financing was of relevance because it was one of the most frequently used explanations behind 
the recession. (Kahle & Stulz, 2013) There are some theories regarding impaired access to 
financing and their impacts on investment activities. The most applied are the credit supply 
shock,  the bank lending supply shock and the amplification mechanisms intensifying the effects 
of a crisis. The bank lending supply shock is the most distinguished theory and describes how a 
negative shock in the supply of bank loans affect firm’s capital expenditures. The theory predicts 
that firms dependent on their relationship with their bank will be more affected of the crisis and 
have to lower debt issuance and capital expenditures more than firms that are not dependent of 
their bank. (Kahle & Stulz, 2013)  A broader theory is the credit supply shock, which is a theory 
that explains the impacts when firms cannot get the financing they require from the credit 
market. The theory of credit supply shocks predicts that a firm dependent of the credit market, 
will also be more affected in terms of debt issuance, equity issuance and capital expenditures.  It 
is also important to include other theories that are not strictly related to the access of financing. 
This is necessary because firms’ investments activities could be reduced because of a decrease in 
the value of their potential investment opportunities. The demand for services and goods are the 
most notable, where a shock could lead to sudden changes in firms investment activities. The 
amplifier mechanism describes how the effects of a breakdown spread and multiplies in the 
financial system. 
There are a couple of articles which research the changes in investment activities during the 
financial crisis, Kahle & Stulz (2013), Almeida, Campello, Laranjeira and Weisbenner (2012) 
and Duchin, Ozbas and Sensoy (2010) these the ones that resemble our research the most. 
Almeida et al (2012) primary research focus is on firms with relatively large portions of long-
term debt maturing during the period from 2007-12-31 to 2008-09-30, and proving that these 
firms invest less than comparable firms which would support the credit lending shock. Duchin et 
al (2010) compare the development in capital expenditures for firms with high cash holdings 
prior to the outbreak of the crisis with the first year of the financial crisis. Their findings support 
the theories of credit supply shock and show that high cash firms cut the capital expenditures less 
than comparable firms during the first year of the crisis. Though, after the Lehman crash, there 
were no significant difference between high cash firms and the rest of the sampled firms. Kahle 
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and Stulz (2013) concludes that the decrease in capital expenditures is not larger for bank 
dependent firms in the US than matching firms in the first year and the two quarters after the 
Lehman crises. Their research also showed contradictions to the theories since net debt issuance 
increased during the first year of the financial crisis for most of the firms and net equity issuance 
decreased until April 2009, this is not in alignment with the substitution effect.  
Buca and Vermeulen (2012) use annual balance sheet data from Germany, France, Italy, Spain, 
Belgium and Portugal during 2000-2009. Their research shows that firms with high bank debt 
reduce their investment substantially more than firms with lower leverage. They also find that 
firms associated with bank-dependency, such as firms in geographical regions where relationship 
banking dominates or firms of smaller size are more affected in terms of decreasing investments.  
Holmberg (2013) use bank lending data, investment data and accounting data on Swedish firms 
to examine how the financial crisis affected corporate investments. But he did not find any strong 
statistical evidence that the decline in capital expenditures was enforced through a credit supply 
shock. The impact of the financial crisis appears to differ between geographical areas. 
There are numerous articles investigating credit supply shock and demand shock in the context 
of the firm’s investment activities during the financial crisis. But articles making the distinction 
between bank lending and credit shocks, and using the amplifier effect, is limited to Kahle and 
Stulz research on the American market. Our research is based upon the method used by Kahle 
and Stulz (2013) by extending it to Northern Europe. The thesis also expands on previous 
research of Northern European market by adding a new research approach.  
1.3 Purpose and Research Questions  
The purpose of this thesis is to study how the most recent financial crisis affected the investment 
activities of firms in Northern Europe. The research is based on theories of bank lending supply 
shocks, credit supply shocks, demand of goods and services shocks and the amplifier effect to 
investigate the impact on investment activities. The predictions of the theories are used to 
formulate categories of groups of firms to test the validity of the theories. 
1. Are bank-dependent firm’s investment activities more sensitive to a bank lending/credit 
supply shock? 
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  2. Are high leverage firm’s investment activities more sensitive to credit supply shock? 
3. Are firms with higher cash holdings less sensitive to a credit supply shock? 
4. Could a decline in investments be explained by a demand shock? 
1.4 Delimitations 
The thesis was originally planned to research three bank-relationship categories. But not gaining 
access to Thomson Reuters LPC’s Dealscan, forced us to exclude one group out of the thesis. 
Since there still are two other groups measuring bank dependence, it is still possible to research 
bank-dependency. The use of this excluded firm category would have further enhanced the 
quality of our research.  
1.5 Thesis Outline 
The first chapter sets the foundation for the thesis with a background of the financial crisis, its 
impacts on financing- and investing activities and statement of the purpose of the thesis. The 
second section provides a comprehensive walkthrough of relevant theories and empirical 
research. The third chapter describes the methodology of the Abadie and Imbens bias-corrected 
matching estimator and the difference-in-difference estimator. The fourth section describes the 
empirical findings of the thesis, first in terms of mean values then the regression outputs. This is 
followed by the fifth chapter containing an analysis of the empirical findings based on the 
theoretical framework and previous research. In the last chapter we conclude the thesis by 
summarizing the findings and putting them in perspective. 
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2. Review of Previous Literature 
The second chapter provides a comprehensive walkthrough of theories and empirical research of 
the impact of negative supply shock in bank lending, credit supply and demand shocks of services 
and goods. Thereto a section of the implication of amplification mechanisms is added. 
 
A firm’s investment policy is mainly depending of the financing policy, and if there are any 
valuable investment opportunities. During the financial crisis the financing policies were infected 
by a negative supply shock where firms had difficulties getting the financing they required. The 
financial crises eventually lead to a negative demand shock in goods and services, which means a 
decrease in valuable investment opportunities. (Kahle & Stulz, 2013) The literature review 
includes theories and previous empirical research of negative shock in supply of bank lending, in 
credit supply and in demand of services and goods in the context of firms investment activities. 
Thereto is added a section about the amplifier mechanisms that intensified the effects of the 
financial crisis. The predictions of the theories are straightforward, whereas the previous 
empirical research display mixed and inconclusive evidence. 
2.1 Negative Shock in Supply of Bank Lending 
A negative supply shock decreases the supply of debt, which, ceteris paribus, leads to a higher 
price on debt (Birch Sørensen & Whitta-Jacobsen, 2010).  When bank lending started to fall in 
the middle of 2007 and then accelerated in the end of 2008 following the burst of the housing 
bubble, the market for structured finance securities such as collateralized debt obligations 
(CDOs) and credit default swaps (CDS) crashed (Ivashina & Scharfstein, 2010; Brunnermeier, 
2009). Although other research shows that until October 2008, there was no decline in the bank 
lending (Chari, Christiano & Kehoe, 2008). This seemingly contradictory evidence can be 
explained by the different methodology used by researchers, where Ivashina & Scharfstein 
(2010) use lending agreements, which do not have to be fully utilized at the point of agreement.  
Banks can be characterized as highly leveraged entities, and since they already initially are 
highly leveraged and thus extra sensitive to decreasing asset values on the balance sheet and 
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therefore cannot simply let the leverage ratio rise. This means that when a bank incurs large 
losses, they have two alternatives: issuing new equity or reducing assets, where a reduction in 
assets can be achieved by selling of current loans or not renewing loans or not accepting new 
loans. (Brunnermeier, 2009; Kahle & Stulz, 2013) This has implications for a firm’s investment- 
and financing activities. A firm that cannot receive the financing required from their relationship 
bank might not be able to receive financing from other sources. Thus, they cannot obtain the 
same amount of debt in aggregated terms. This leads to the firm possibly having to reduce their 
investment activities in response. It also means that a firm with low leverage might not be as 
dependent of debt to be able to finance their capital expenditures. (Kahle & Stulz, 2013). History 
points out that firms relying on their relationship bank for financing, generally have to pay a 
premium when they look for financing elsewhere, which means they would be penalized on a 
much larger scale during a bank crisis (Slovin, Sushka & Polonchek, 1993). 
The cost for banks to borrow money increased during the crisis. Santos (2011) shows that the 
bigger the losses a bank incurred, the greater the cost of its lending would be. The bank lending 
literature shows that there is a decrease in lending, however it does not tell the importance of the 
shock to the firms. Firms that cannot receive loans from banks can either cut investments or try 
to get financing from other sources (Kahle & Stulz, 2013). Buca and Vermeulen (2012) shows 
that firms with high bank debt reduce their investment substantially more during the financial 
crisis compared to firms with lower leverage. Their findings also prove that firms associated with 
bank-dependency, such as firms in geographical regions where relationship banking dominates, 
or where firms of smaller size, are more affected in terms of lower investments.  Dewally and 
Shao (2013) contradicts Buca and Vermeulen (2012) when they prove that bank-dependent firms 
lowered their leverage less than firms with access to the public debt market, meaning they are 
less affected by a debt supply shock and therefore will handle the crisis better. Firms with access 
to bond markets are replacing bank loans with bond loans during the crisis, according to Adrain, 
Colla and Shin (2012) and Becker and Ivashina (2012). History also points out, that in times of 
reduced bank lending, firms instead issues equity (Leary, 2009). Recent research of the 
Portuguese data by Iver, Lopes, Peydró and Schoar (2010) demonstrates that firms substitute 
bank loans for other financing. Firms also more extensively utilized their line of credits, which 
curb the negative effects on investment. Although the higher than normal usage of credit lines, 
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could be due to that other financing sources became relatively more expensive (Ivashina & 
Scharfstein (2010).  
Kahle and Stulz (2013) found that small bank dependent firms had a lower decrease in every 
period of the crisis compared to their control firms. This was a contradiction to what was 
predicted by the negative shock in bank lending but corresponded to the earlier findings of Kahle 
and Stulz (2010) and Iver, Lopes, Peydró and Schoar (2010).  Their results did not support the 
prediction that high leverage and bank dependent firms should have been more affected in the 
first year of the crisis during a bank lending shock. 
2.2 Negative Shock in Credit Supply 
The banking system is just one of a numerous ways which a firm can obtain debt financing, 
where the credit market is another one (Kahle & Stulz, 2013). Gorton (2010) and Acharya et al 
(2009) describes how the development of the shock was not only a bank lending shock but in a 
wider sense a credit shock. The new banking system driven by innovation allows for traditional 
banking loans to be resold in a way that resemble the traditional credit market where bonds are 
issued and then traded on a market by investors.  
When the shock struck and the market started to adjust the valuation of credit products, investors 
started a flight towards credit investments of higher quality, as modelled and described by 
Caballero & Krishnamurthy (2008) building on a foundation set by (Knight, 1921) and later 
developed by (Bewley, 2002). Their models show that when flights towards quality occur, the 
cost of capital for firm’s increases and some firms might not be able to lend at all. In extension 
this might lead to a malfunctioning credit market where investors cannot estimate the probability 
of default and thus not the probability distributions of bond payoffs. This could lead to a market 
“freeze”, where the uncertainty obstructs investor from trading and the liquidity dries out. The 
freeze also includes bank loans, since this would prevent banks from creating new structured 
products of newly issued loans. (Easley & O’Hara, 2010) Also, the flight towards quality has 
negative implications for equity issuance due to its risky nature. (Kahle & Stulz, 2013) The 
theories of credit supply shocks imply that a shock would generally lead to a decrease in capital 
expenditures for firms. Firms more heavily relying on debt should be the most impacted.  
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Almeida, Campello and Weisbach (2004) find that a large part of credit supply shocks are 
generally hedged by substitution from debt to usage of cash holdings. Fazzari and Pettersen 
(1993) and Lin & Paravisini (2010) shows in their article that firms dependent of external 
financing have precautionary benefits on hoarding up cash prior to a credit supply shock. Firms 
also hoard up cash in times of crisis, as a response to the higher uncertainty.  
Almeida et al (2012) research firms with relatively large portions of long-term debt maturing 
during the period from Q4 2007 to Q3 2008 and prove that these firms invest less than 
comparable firms which would support a credit lending shock. The methodology with a sample 
of 86 firms did however not show if the decline in investments is due to inability to renew loans 
or due to declining business possibilities. 
Duchin, Ozbas and Sensoy (2010) compare the development in capital expenditures for firms 
with high cash holdings prior to the outbreak of the crisis with the first year of the financial 
crisis. The reason for a focus on only the first year after the outbreak of the crisis is due to that it 
is more probable that the changes in investment policies is due to the credit supply shock as 
opposed to events created within the actual corporate sector. Their findings support the theories 
of a credit supply shock and show that high cash firms cut their capital expenditures less than 
comparable firms during the first year of the crisis. Though, after the Lehman crash, there were 
no significant difference between high cash firms and the rest of the sampled firms. 
Campello, Graham and Harvey (2010) asked 1050 chief financial officers in a worldwide survey 
how their firm had been affected of the global financial crisis. The result of their survey is that 
constrained firms reduce their investments more than other firms. Constrained firms also used up 
more of their cash holdings than other firms. Over half of the CFO’s in the sample state that they 
had to pass on attractive investment opportunities due to not being able to get the required 
external financing. Gertler and Gilchrist (1993) show that small producing firms are more 
affected than large producing firms in times of tighter credit. Kalemi-Ozxan and Kamil (2009) 
provide evidence that the reduction of credit supply was the key factor in constraining firms from 
investing and achieving growth in the aftermath of the financial crisis. This contradicts Bakke 
(2011) who showed that the credit crisis only have small effects on investments. 
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Lin & Paravisini (2010) show that firms increased their issuance of equity following the crisis 
whereas Lemmon & Roberts (2010) do not find any evidence of substitution from debt to 
alternative financing sources during the crisis. According to Kahle and Stulz (2010) the increased 
fears and uncertainty plays a big part in determining the level of firms financing, and potentially 
played as big part as the actual lending constraints itself. Kahle & Stulz’s (2013) result contradict 
the expectations of a negative shock in credit supply. Their findings prove that the decrease in 
capital expenditures is lower for high leverage firms than the average for the whole sample.  
2.3 Negative Shock in Demand of Services and Goods 
The development of firms’ investment policies is not only subject to adjustment due to shocks in 
credit supply and bank lending supply but also to a demand shock. A demand shock occurs when 
the demand of goods decrease and leads to a drop in capital expenditures because the value of 
investment opportunities decreases. A decrease in capital expenditures due to a demand shock, 
ceteris paribus, would also lead to a situation where firms need less financing for its operations, 
resulting in reduction in issuance of equity and debt, thus a lower price on debt. A demand shock 
entails reductions in turnover for firms, which leads to a declining market value of the firms, 
ultimately, leading to worsen lending terms. The aggregated demand is a function of private 
consumption, real private investment and real government demand for goods and services, where 
private consumption is the most sizable component. Private consumption is determined by 
disposable income, expected future income growth, interest rate and market value of private 
wealth. Real private investment is dependent of the real interest rate, predetermined capital stock 
and state of confidence. Real government demand for goods and services is the most stable input 
in the aggregated demand and is dependent on, for example, governmental debt accumulation 
and tax incomes. (Birch Sørensen & Whitta-Jacobsen, 2010) 
There are many examples of phenomenon in the economic development during the crisis that 
supports the presence of a demand shock. The credit crunch imposed a large reduction in 
consumer lending, and this contraction lead to credit constraints where consumers could not lend 
as much as they wanted on the going market interest rate. (Birch Sørensen & Whitta-Jacobsen, 
2010; Acharya et al, 2009) The crash of the housing bubble largely affected the market value of 
private wealth negatively. There was also a widespread uncertainty about the development of the 
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economic environment, which impacted the state of confident negatively. (Acharya, Philippon, 
Richardson & Roubini, 2009; Brunnermeier, 2009) The rise of uncertainty steer firms to increase 
their level of cash holdings to protect themselves from adverse changes in cash flow (Keynes, 
1936; Baum, Caglayan, Ozkan, Talavera, 2006; Bates, Kahle, & Stulz, 2009; Hugonnier, 
Malamud, Morellec, 2014). This is especially true for financially constrained firms according to 
Han and Qiu (2008).  Campello, Giambona, Graham and Harvey (2011) showed that lowered 
operational performance in 2008 and 2009 had negative effects on firms’ ability to get bank 
financing. They also showed that firms that had problems with getting the financing they 
required invested less. The uncertainty of future cash flows also leads to a decrease in the 
optimal debt ratio through the increasing cost of financial distress (Kahle & Stulz, 2013). In case 
of a sharper increase in uncertainty, it would be more optimal to not exercise real option and 
postpone it, which would also result in a fall in capital expenditures (Bloom, 2009).  
The price of credit increased as a response to the financial crisis, which could be seen as 
evidence for a supply shock in financing, as opposed to a demand shock in goods and services 
since a demand shock of implies a lower credit price. But the state of the interest rate market 
leading up to the crisis can be described as a low interest rate environment, making it difficult to 
infer what shock was actually the driving force in the debt market (Kahle & Stulz, 2013). After 
the Lehman Brothers crash the interest rates experienced explosive growth (Acharya et al, 2009), 
but at that point the worlds GDP had started declining, see figure 1 in appendix, indicating the 
presence of a demand shock of services and goods.  
Mian and Sufi (2010), Mian, Rao and Sufi (2011) and Mian and Sufi (2012) prove that there was 
a demand shock of services and goods following the crisis which decreased the level of attractive 
investment opportunities for firms, which also decreased the required level of funding for 
investment activities. This means that the demand shock of services and goods also is an 
important explanation to the changes in investment activities during the financial crisis.   
2.4 Amplification Mechanisms in the Financial Crisis  
The magnitude of the effects of the crisis was amplified when the investors with the same 
exposures acted in a similar way simultaneously. The classic example of an amplification 
mechanism is the bank run. When depositors receive negative information about a bank (Gorton, 
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1988) where they are depositors, the depositors hurries to get their deposits out of the bank, and 
thus amplifying the negative effects the bank is subject to. A more recent amplification 
phenomenon is caused by the interconnectedness of banks (counterparty risk), where one bank is 
financing another bank that in turn is financing a third bank and so forth. When the first bank is 
hit by a shock, the effect will multiply when spread through the banking system creating a 
domino effect. (Brunnermeier, Oehmke, 2013) 
The amplification effect can be observed by comparing the value of defaults on subprime 
mortgages and other defaulted loans and compared then compare with the much larger cost of 
the effects following the crisis (Gorton, 2008; Blanchard, 2009). Researcher have divided the 
amplification mechanisms into balance sheet amplifiers such as leverage, tight credit conditions 
and limited capital and information amplifiers including opacity, complexity and uncertainty 
(Krishnamurthy, 2009). 
When the asset value of firms decline, it lowers the market value of equity and collateral. These 
are developments that lower a firm’s debt capacity, making it hard to lend as much as they 
previously could. (Kiyotaki & More, 1997) A declining asset value also affect the effective 
leverage of the firm, which intensifies agency cost due to interest conflicts between shareholders 
and debt holders. This can be seen when firms heading towards bankruptcy has incentives to 
gamble for resurrection. (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Holmström & Tirole, 1997) In a situation 
where the higher leverage leads to debt overhang, issuance of equity is unattractive for 
shareholders since part of such issuance would only contribute to the value of the debt holders 
(Myers, 1977).  
Theories about amplification mechanisms predict that when asset values and equity values fall, 
so will debt, equity issuance and capital expenditures. These effects should be more pronounced 
for more leveraged firms compared to firms with lower leverage. (Stulz & Kahle, 2013) 
Prior research about amplification mechanisms in the context of financial crisis and investment 
policies is limited. To our knowledge the only paper studying this is Kahle and Stulz, 2013. They 
investigate US firms including 48 202 firm-quarterly observations. Their result shows that there 
are no differences between highly levered firms and the rest of the sample in the context of 
decrease in capital expenditures. This contradicts the theories that firms with high leverage 
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would expect a larger decrease in capital expenditures. The results also contradict with the theory 
since unlevered firms had a higher decrease in capital expenditures in percentage than highly 
levered firms.   
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3. Method  
The third chapter describes the methodical approach used to conduct the study. It provides a 
walkthrough of the sample, collection of the data, construction of groups of firms and time 
periods. It describes the use of dummies to structure the dataset after groups and time periods, 
and the regressions of the Abadie and Imbens bias-corrected matching estimator and the 
difference-in-difference treatment effect. 
3.1 Research Method 
The study researches the effects the financial crisis had on financing and investment decisions 
during the period from 2006-06-01 to 2010-03-31. The study is based on an statistical method 
originated by Abadie, Drukker, Herr and Imbens (2004) which has been further developed by 
Almeida, Campello, Laranjeira and Weisbenner (2012) and Kahle and Stulz (2013) to a 
methodology applicable for testing financing and investment decision under macroeconomic 
shocks such as a financial crisis. The main variable of interest is the changes in the firm’s 
investment over the crisis in response to change of the financial environment. The thesis research 
how firms issue debt and equity and the development in cash holdings to create a framework for 
the analysis of the change in investment activities. The methodological process is deductive and 
has foundations in a literary review of theory and previous empirical studies (Bryman & Bell, 
2011). The variables, time periods, and the different groups of firms were formulated so they are 
homogeneous to the methodology used by Kahle and Stulz (2013) in their research of the 
American market, this to enable comparisons between the impacts on financing and investing 
decision in the US and Northern Europe. The time period can be divided into four sub periods, 
pre-crisis (2006-09-30 to 2007-06-30), first year of crisis (2007-09-30 to 2008-06-30), post-
Lehman (2008-09-30 to 2009-03-31), last year of crisis (2009-06-30 to 2010-03-31) in order to 
describe the evolution of the crisis. 
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3.2 The Data 
3.2.1 Sample 
The sample was created to research the Northern European market. In order to be sure to have 
access to all data needed it was further narrowed down to public firms. This method allowed the 
possibility to choose different stock indices to include in the sample. The indices included in our 
sample are the OMX Nordic index, the German CDAX index, and the English FTSE All-Share 
Index. When creating our sample it was important to include firms of a variety of different sizes 
and other characteristics, therefore firms from small cap to large cap is included. This inclusion 
of different kinds of firm-characteristics allows for testing of theories and previous empirical 
findings. When creating our sample it was important to include firms of a variety of different 
sizes and other characteristics in order to be able to create the different groups needed to test the 
different theories. Firms with Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) as Utilities (7000-7999) 
and Financials (8000-8999) was excluded from the sample. This is done for two reasons. Utilities 
and financials have a business model that deviates from the rest of the industries to do business. 
The business model of financial companies implies a higher leverage than other firms, but this 
high leverage does not have the same effect as a high leverage would have for non-financial 
firms and utilities is less cyclical than the average industry. It is common practice to exclude 
these industries in quantitative financial research, so in order to enhance comparability it is 
reasonable to do so.  
3.2.2 Data Collection 
 
Three different databases were used to collect the secondary data needed for our research; S&P 
Capital IQ, Thomson Reuters DataStream and Thomson Reuters Eikon. Capital IQ was used to 
collect the cash flow statement posts “capital expenditures” and “operating cash flow”, the 
income statement post “sales”, the balance sheet items “total assets”, “retained earnings”, “total 
Data	  collection	  
Index Total	  Constituents Without	  financials	  and	  utilities	  adjusted	  for	   Sample	  after	  drop	  due	  to	  missing	  values
double	  listing	  and	  multiple	  stock	  classes
OMX	  Nordic 566 419 189
CDAX 492 342 198
FTSE	  All-­‐Share 625 344 204
Total 1683 1105 591
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equity” and “cash & short term investments”. Capital IQ was further used to check if firms have 
credit revolvers. There are some problems when trying to retrieve quarterly data since many of 
the items in Capital IQ only is provided in annual or semi-annual basis, and in less detail as 
quarterly. The ambition was to collect quarterly data, but in some instances only semi-annual 
data has been available. If only annual data have been available or where some quarterly data 
have been missing, the firm has been removed from the sample. This method of dropping firms 
has adverse effect on the reliability due to a survivor bias, because firms that have been delisted 
during our research period will not make the sample. Delisted firms are often financially 
distressed firms acquired by other firms or for other reasons are no longer seen as suitable for 
being listed on a stock exchange. This means that firms with severely declining results during 
our research period will be excluded from our sample, leading to a biased sample. Where Capital 
IQ only provides semi-annual data, for income statement and cash flow statement posts, they 
calculate an average by dividing the semi-annual number over the two underlying quarters. There 
is little to do about the availability of data; the decision of accepting semi-annual values is a 
trade-off in reliability of the impact that semi-annual data have, and the reduction in sample size 
the dropping of semi-annual data would lead to. When analysing our regression outputs, it has to 
be taken into account that the use of semi-annual data sometimes will lead to a delayed impact in 
or regression output. Further, firms with negative values in total assets, in sales, or in cash and 
short term investments have been dropped. We have also excluded also firms with cash and short 
term investments greater than total assets, and firms that have changed their fiscal year during 
the research.  
To obtain credit ratings Eikon was used, where credit ratings existed, the latest rating was 
applied to the research. Finally DataStream was used to get Market-to-book ratios and Industry 
Classification Benchmarks.  
3.3 Time Frame 
The time period can be divided into four sub periods. The pre-crisis (2006-09-30 to 2007-06-30) 
starts before the unfolding of the crisis and ends at the peak of the credit boom. The first year of 
the crisis (2007-09-30 to 2008-06-30) is the period building up to Lehman crisis. The post-
Lehman period (2008-09-30 to 2009-03-31) is created to be able to analyse a time period where 
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the credit market froze. The last year of crisis (2009-06-30 to 2010-03-31) accounts for a period 
where the worst part of financing supply shock had started to calm down. The use of periods 
enables an analysis of the crisis impacts as it unfolded. The period classification was established 
by Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010), and later used by Kahle and Stulz (2013).  
3.4 Construction of the Groups 
The groups were constructed to have the characteristics that are of theoretical relevance in our 
research. The groups are useful since it allows the testing of previous research and theories in the 
subject and evaluate if a particular characteristic seems to be impacted differently than other 
characteristics. To be able to compare our results with previous research all groups except for 
low leverage firms, as defined in Kahle and Stulz (2013). The reason for structuring a low 
leverage group instead of a no leverage group is made because there were too few firms that 
would qualify for a no leverage group. 
3.4.1 High Leverage Firm 
The first group is the high leverage firm which is defined as the highest quintile of leveraged 
firms. This is to test if leverage has an impact on capital expenditures. Highly levered firms are 
by nature either credit and/or debt dependent and should thus be more impacted. The amplifier 
effect also predicts that highly levered firms should be more impacted. 
3.4.2 High Leverage, Bank Dependent Firm 
The second group is high leverage and bank dependent firms which also contain the highest 
quintile of leveraged firms, but out of the these firms only the firms with either a bank loan or a 
credit revolver at the end of 2005 and 2006 were kept. A data collection problem is that gauge 
whether or not a bank loan or revolver is actually part of a bank relationship, to better the 
classification only firms that have had the bank loan or revolver in more than 2 consecutive 
years. Highly levered firms who are also bank dependent should be more impacted since they are 
highly levered and rely largely on bank debt as financing source and thus are sensitive to a bank 
lending supply shock. Again, the balance sheet multiplier effect also predicts that a highly 
levered firm should be more affected. 
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3.4.3 Small And Bank Dependent Firm 
The small and bank dependent firm group is constructed by taking the bottom quintile of firms 
based on total assets. To make sure of the bank dependency it was checked that the firms do not 
have access to capital markets by deleting the firms with credit ratings. This group of firms rely 
strongly on bank debt and are thus predicted to be more sensitive to a bank lending supply shock. 
3.4.4 Low Leverage Firm  
Low leverage firms are firms that have had debt-to-total assets of below 10 % in each quarter for 
the three years leading up to the end of the second quarter of 2006. Firms with low leverage are 
of interest because during a credit supply shock, they are predicted to be less affected in terms of 
capital expenditure. This is because they were not as dependent on it in the first place. A firm 
with low leverage are according to the amplifier effect expected to be less affected than 
comparable firms. 
3.4.5 High Cash Firm 
The high cash firms are constructed by taking the firms that have been in the top quintile of cash 
holdings, for every quarter during the three years leading up to the second quarter of 2006. A 
firm with a large amount of cash could use their excess cash if they do not get the refinance they 
need, and thus are predicted to be less affected. 
3.5 Variables 
The variable that is measured and researched in this study is the dependent variable. The 
dependent variables are created to be homogeneous with previous research (Kahle & Stulz, 
2013) and founded by the theoretical framework (Brooks, 2008). To fulfil the purpose of the 
study research had to be made on four different dependent variables: capital expenditures, debt 
issuance, and equity issuance and cash holdings which are defined as follows: 
 
!"#$%"&  !"#!$%&'()!* =    !!"#$!%  !"#!$%&'()!*!"!#$  !""#$"  
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!"#$  !""#$%&' =   ∆  !"!#$  !"#$!"!#$  !""#$" 
 
 
!"#$%&  !""#$%&' =   ∆  !"!#$  !"##"$  !"#$%& −   ∆  !"#$%&"'  !"#$%$&'!"!#$  !""#$"  
 
 
!"#ℎ  ℎ!"#$%&' =   ∆  !"#ℎ  !"#  !ℎ!"#  !"#$  !"#$%&'$"&%!"!#$  !""#$"  
 
 
All the independent variables in the regressions are dummy variables. They are created to 
include the group dimension and the time period dimension in the regression. How the dummies 
were used is further specified in the description of respective regression model. 
3.6 Descriptive statistics 
The mean values of the dependent variables are used to present the empirical findings. The mean 
values are presented for the dependent variables for the entire sample as well as the subgroups 
for the four different time periods. To be able to use the mean values for more than only 
indication, the differences has to be of statistical significance. 
3.6.2 T-test of the Significance of the Difference of the Means 
T-tests are applied to infer if it is possible to make any statistical significant conclusions of the 
difference between the means values of the different time periods. Student’s t-test assumes that 
the data has a normal distribution. 
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! =    !! − !! − (!! − !!)!!!!! + !!!!!
 
 
The Students t-test was applied to test the majority of the differences in mean values. But for the 
dependent variables capital expenditures, debt issuance and cash holdings and the period 
between pre- and post-Lehman a paired two-sample t-statistic are used. The paired two sample t-
statistic can only be applied for these differences because it required that the data had the same 
number of observations, one for the period before the bankruptcy of Lehman and one for the 
period after, thus a within-groups design. (Manly, 1994, Marcoulides & Hershberger, 1997). 
For both student’s t-test and paired t-test the hypotheses are: 
H0: There is no difference between mean values of the dependent variables between the periods.  
H1: there is a difference between mean values of the dependent variables between the periods.  
3.7 Choice of Regression Models 
The thesis uses both the Abadie and Imbens matching estimator method (2004) and a regular 
difference-in-difference method in order to triangulate the empirical results. Both methods 
investigate changes in investments, debt issuance, equity issuance and cash holding during the 
crisis.  
3.7.1 Abadie and Imbens Bias-corrected Matching Estimator  
The use of matching methods allows us to estimate counterfactual outcomes by pairing the group 
of firms (treatment firms) of with firms who has similar attributes (control firms) except for the 
variable of interest. This is a method with the ambition to isolate the observed effect to the 
variable of interest, where the model does not rely on a clear source of exogenous variation for 
identification. Matching methods can remedy asymptotic biases due to endogeneity or self-
selection. (Roberts & Whited, 2012) 
Using the Abadie and Imbens (2002) bias-corrected matching estimator for average treatment 
effect to match our treatment groups with control groups. This method allows for individual 
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observations to be used for matching more than once. Compared to other models that do not 
allow multiple matching this method lowers the bias but increases the variance. When allowing 
for multiple matching the requirements of observations declines, since one observation can be 
used more than once (Roberts & Whited, 2012). According to Rosenbaum (1995) this also 
mitigates the sensitivity to the order that the treatment observations are matched. The standard 
propensity score approach is a more commonly used method, but research in the subject of the 
thesis have often applied the Abadie and Imbens, as done by Almeida, Campello, Laranjeira and 
Weisbenner (2012) and Kahle and Stulz (2013). The Abadie-Imbens matching estimator 
minimizes the Mahalanobis distance between the vector of observed covariates of treated and 
non-treated firms (Abadie, Drukker, Herr & Imbens, 2004).  
The Abadie and Imbens bias-corrected matching estimator allows only for the difference 
between treated and non-treated firms in one dimension, if there is a difference between the firms 
in the subsample compared to control groups. Since the aim is to make this approach comparable 
with a regular difference-in-difference regression some adjustments were made in order to 
include both the group dimension and the time dimension in the model. Firstly a group dummy 
was created to indicate which firms were parts of the different treatment groups. Firms included 
in a treatment group took the value of “1” whereas the rest of the sample took the value “0”, 
indicating that they are potential matching firms. Then the averages for each and every period 
and for all the firms were calculated. Calculations of the averages followed for all groups and all 
the periods, which includes; first year of crisis compared to pre-crisis, post-Lehman period 
compared to pre-crisis and then last year of crisis compared to pre-crisis. Using the differences 
calculated in the previous step the dimension problem is solved, thus the model was made two-
dimensional. The model now allows for comparisons in the changes of the dependent variable 
across the groups and across the different time-periods. 
When using the function “nnmatch” in Stata to calculate the Abadie and Imbens average 
matching estimator there are a few different treatment effects that could be used for estimation. 
Because our intention is to examine how the firms in the subsample groups were affected in 
relation to control groups, not to the population, the sample average treatment effect (SATT) is 
the most relevant. 
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   !"##: !     !"#$%&,! =    1!! !! 1 − !!(0)! !!!!  
 
Wi specifies if the firm receives treatment or not, the number of treated firms equal N1. 
 
When running the regressions two additional options, “biasadj” and “robusth”, are added. The 
“biasadj”-option is the bias-corrected matching estimator, which uses the same set of matching 
covariates linearly in the function. The “robusth”-option creates heteroskedasticity consistent 
standard errors by using matches in the second matching stage across observations of the same 
treatment level. (Abadie, Drukker, Herr & Imbens, 2004) The number of matches per firm for 
both matching procedures was set to one.  
For SATT the average biased estimator is:   !!!"#,! = 1!! !! − !!(0)!:!!!!  
 
The firm specific information that was applied to match the control firms with our treatment 
groups are market to book ratio, operating cash flow, size, cash holdings, leverage ratio, two 
digit industry code and credit rating. These matching variables are widely understood to capture 
large part of otherwise unobserved firm heterogeneity and are the same matching variables as 
Kahle and Stulz (2013) and Almeida, Campello, Laranjeira and Weisbenner (2012) applied. 
However we have not normalized size, which previous researchers did by using the natural 
logarithm of total assets.  Cash holdings are not used as matching variable when cash holding is 
the dependent variable. The matching is structured as to pair firms within same industries, and 
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close credit ratings so that diversity between firms in terms of their creditworthiness and the 
shocks in demand of their products should not impact the regression output.  
 
The matching variables if formulated as flows: 
 !"#$%&  !"  !""#  !"#$% =   !"#$%&  !"#$%  !"  !"#$%&!""#  !"#$%  !"  !"#$%&      !"#$%&'()  !"#ℎ  !"#$ = !"#ℎ  !"#$  !"#$  !"#$%&'!(%)  !"#$%$#$&'   !"#$ = !""#  !"#$%  !"!#$  !""#$" 
 
!"#ℎ  ℎ!"#$%&' =   !"#ℎ  !"#  !ℎ!"#  !"#$  !"#$%&'$"&%!""#  !"#!"  !"  !"!#$  !""#$"  
 
!"#"$%&"  !"#$% =   !""#  !"#$%  !"  !"!#$  !"#$!""#  !"#$%  !"  !"#$%&      !"#  !"#"$  !"#$%&'(  !"#$ = !"#$%  !"#"$%  !"  !ℎ!  !"#$%&'(  !"#$$%!"#$%"&'  !"#$ℎ!"#$  
 
 !"#$%&  !"#$%& =   !"#$%&  !"#$%  !"#  !"#$%&'()$*  !"#$%  !ℎ!  !""#$’!  5− !"#$%  !"#$%  1   no  Credit  rating    2   in  default, very  little  chance  of  recovery    3   very  high  credit  risk  to  in  or  near  default  with  possibility  of  recovery    4   moderate  credit  risk  to  high  credit  risk    
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(5)  minimal  credit  risk  to  low  credit  risk   
 
Cash flow from operational activities, book value of total assets, cash and short-term investment, 
book value total debt, book value of total equity are retrieved from Capital IQ without further 
calculations. The market value of equity is collected from Datastream, as is the Industry 
Classification Benchmark whereas credit ratings are provided by Eikon. A more detailed 
description of the data collection process if found under 3.2.2. 
When matching with industrial classification benchmark all numbers except for the two first 
were deleted. Except for credit ratings the matching variables are denoted in numerical values 
making the matching process easier. The credit ratings were not denoted in numerical values, but 
in grades. To smooth the matching process the credit ratings were divided into five subgroups 
with numerical values using the Moody’s description. (Ganguin & Bilardello, 2005) A 5-grade 
scale was applied to improve the precision of the matching, whereas previous research often only 
used a 3-grade scale as in Almeida, Campello, Laranjeira and Weisbenner (2012). 
3.7.2 Difference-in-Difference 
Difference-in-Difference treatment effects technique is used to examine causal consequences of 
distinct changes in economic environment, as in the case of the thesis; the credit supply shocks 
effect on firms’ investment activates (“natural experiments”). Treatment and Control groups are 
useful since it creates an understanding of what effects are due to the treatment (for example high 
leverage) and what effects would have occurred anyway. This kind of cross-sectional 
comparison of two differences helps mitigating potential problems of omitted trends. Difference-
in-difference estimator compares both the difference between groups and difference between 
time-periods simultaneously: by using this method instead of only a single difference estimator 
the problem with omitted trends can be avoided. In the difference-in-difference comparison the 
same firms are treated pre and post the financial crisis, using all firms in the whole sample which 
is not included in the subsample as untreated firms, which mitigates problems with unobserved 
differences. (Roberts & Whited, 2012) 
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The key assumption to achieve consistency of the 
regression outputs in the difference-in-difference 
estimates is that of “parallel trends” or the zero 
correlation assumption. This means that if comparing a 
treatment group and a control group, but where the 
treatment group did not actually receive any treatment, 
the change in the dependent variable should be equal 
for both groups. Figure 1 shows the realized average 
control outcome for the control group, which is 
independent of whether or not the treatment group 
actually gets the treatment. The realized average 
treatment outcome shows the effect when the treatment 
group gets the treatment, which changes the trend of the 
outcome, whereas the counterfactual average treatment outcome line describes the outcome if the 
treatment-group does not receive any treatment. This methodology enabled an analysis of the 
average values of the dependent variable of treatment and control group pre-crisis (before 
treatment), how difference in trend changed in the first year of crisis (after treatment) and the 
following periods Post-Lehman period and Last year of crisis (as the treatment continues). 
 
The regression model for the applied difference-in-difference estimator is: 
 ! =   !! + !!!! + !!!! + !! ∗ !! ∗ !! + ! 
 
Where, !!,!!  and  !! ∗ !! are dummies. 
 !!is a group dummy that was created to indicate which firms were parts of the different 
treatment groups 
Figure 1: Parallell trends assumption (Roberts 
& Whited, 2012, p.42) edited by authers 
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!!is a time-period dummy. The time-period dummies are used to indicate which time-periods are 
compared to with each other. The first time dummy is the prevsfirst, which indicate that it is the 
first year of crisis that is compared to the pre-cresis period. The second time dummy is the 
prevspostlehman which means it is the post-lehman period that is compared to the pre-crisis 
period. The last time-period dummy is the prevslast which compares the last year of crisis with 
the pre-crisis period. !! ∗ !!is a combination of the group dummy and the time-period dummy and is named DGT 
which is the difference-in-difference dummy. The dummy is created to capture, β3, the variation 
that is created due to the treatment effect. 
There are some limitations when using the difference-in-difference method. There are concerns 
about the validity of the difference-in-difference estimate due to possible endogeneity problem. 
Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan, (2004) argue that the regression could have serial correlation 
problem which is often ignored, but there are three reasons for why this is a problem when using 
the difference in difference method. The first reason is about the length of the time series used, 
but due to the use quarterly data, this should be less of a problem since up to 14 observations per 
firm and variable is included when comparing between different time-periods. The second reason 
is that the dependent variable used in the regression is often highly positively serially correlated. 
The third aspect, which often is an inherent part of the model, is that there is usually only a small 
change in within the firm over time in the treatment variable. These concerns could lead to that 
an under estimation of the variance of the beta, which could negatively impact the inference of 
the regression output. 
3.8 Assumptions of Regression Model    
The difference-in-difference is estimated with a pooled Panel Least Square regression. This 
regression type is based on the commonly used OLS-regression, which requires a variety of 
different assumptions should be fulfilled to achieve unbiased coefficients and inferences. 
Because of the large number of regression performed, only random spot tests was carried out on 
the different performed regressions, this due to the limitation of time to execute this thesis. 
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3.8.1 The Errors Have Zero Mean 
The first assumption is that the mean of the error term equals zero. Since an error term is 
included in the regression this assumption cannot be violated and thus no further testing is 
required. (Brooks, 2008) 
3.8.2 Homoscedasticity  
The second assumption is that of homoscedasticity, which means that the variance of the errors is 
constant. To test for if heteroskedasticity is present a Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test is manually 
performed. The output of the F-tests show that the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity cannot be 
rejected for any of the tests, thus there is no evidence of heteroskedasticity. This means that 
heteroskedasticity will not negatively affect the standard errors and thus not the inference of the 
coefficients. The Abadie and Imbens matching estimator regression (2004) is designed to control 
for heteroskedasticity. (Brooks, 2008)  
3.8.3 Autocorrelation 
We used the Durbin-Watson to test for autocorrelation. The Durbin-Watson tests for first order 
autocorrelation. If the test statistic is close to 2, the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation should 
not be rejected. The tests show varying results where autocorrelation could be present in some 
regressions. This could be due to seasonal patterns in firm’s investment patterns. In the cases 
where autocorrelation is present, the coefficients would still be unbiased but they would be 
inefficient even as the sample grows. (Brooks, 2008) 
3.8.4 Non Stochastic  
The fourth assumption is that the OLS estimator is non-stochastic, which means that the error 
term should not be correlated with the independent variables. The endogeneity problem is 
relevant since the impact of debt supply shocks as explanatory tool for a firm’s investment is 
associated with a variety of firm-specific variables. In the Abadie and Imbens matching estimator 
some of these variables that could potentially create endogeneity are mitigated through the 
matching process where firms of similar characteristics are matched. This is however not the 
case in the difference-in-difference regression where the treatment group is matched with the rest 
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of the whole sample. Since a pre-crisis period was included, the endogeneity problem is less 
crucial compared to if only a crisis period were tested.  This is because endogeneity would only 
be prevalent if there is a relation between the pre-crisis periods investment limitations and 
unobservable changes in investment opportunities the in the upcoming period. To assess the 
correlation a couple of correlation matrices are created. The performed tests did not indicate any 
large correlation, so the assumption that the OLS estimates are non-stochastic can be made. 
(Brooks, 2008; Gujarati & Porter, 2010; Almeida, Campello, Laranjeira &Weisbenner, 2012) 
3.8.5 Normal distribution 
The fifth and last assumption is that the disturbances are normally distributed. The most common 
test for normality is the Jarque-Bera test. The Jarque-Bera tests if the coefficients of skewness 
and excess kurtosis are jointly zero. The tests performed showed that the data is not normally 
distributed. But Brooks (2008) argue that a violation of the normality assumption is minor if the 
sample is large. This phenomenon is referred to the law of large numbers or the central limit 
theorem, where a large numbers of mean values have a tendency to converge to a normal 
distribution. The choice was made not to winsorize, or remove outliers, as not to manipulate the 
data. (Brooks, 2008) 
3.8.6 No Multicollinearity 
Multicollinearity or near Multicollinearity is present when the independent variables are to 
highly correlated with each other. If present, the coefficients would not be estimated correctly 
due to the lack of variance between the variables. The rule of thumb is that multicollinearity is 
problematic when the correlation exceeds 0,8. A few correlation matrices were created to check 
the correlation between the independent variables, where the result indicated no sign of 
multicollinearity. (Brooks, 2008; Gujarati & Porter, 2010)  
3.9 Validity & Reliability  
Validity of a study ascertains that the research methodology is designed to measure what it is 
intended to measure. This is a key for making sure that the analysis and conclusions of the 
material is correct. (Bryman & Bell, 2011) When choosing methodology previous research 
articles in the subject have been examined, to make sure that our methodology is appropriate in 
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our fields of studies. Our study is based on a dataset including England, Germany, Sweden, 
Finland, Denmark and Iceland, all located in the northern region of Europe. When conducting 
research it is important to account for the external validity, meaning weather the results of 
research can be generalized is applicable for markets outside of our research scope. In general, 
different regions have different types of economies and are interlinked in different ways, 
implying that generalization should be done with great consideration for the different 
environmental features. The generalization problem is addressed by comparing the results of the 
thesis with previous research in other markets. Another important factor is the internal validity, 
that there is a causal relation between independent variable and the dependent variables. This is 
addressed by using inference of statistical significance on the mean values of the dependent 
variables as well as for the regression outputs. (Bryman & Bell, 2011) 
Another important aspect when conducting research is to assure the reliability of the study. The 
results of the study should be independent of the researcher (Ryan, Scapens & Theobald, 2002), 
meaning that a repetition of the study will yield the same results (Bryman & Bell, 2011). Well-
established and well-reputed databases such as S&P Capital IQ, Thomson Reuters DataStream 
and Thomson Reuters Eikon have been used to retrieve data. These data providers have access to 
primary information about the companies and thereto all the countries in the study are subject to 
IFRS where annual reports are audited. Though, the scarcity of availability in terms of databases 
makes it impossible to triangulate the data collected. This makes it harder to assess the quality of 
our dataset, which impacts the reliability of the methodology negatively. Dropping of firms from 
the sample is solely based on missing data or theoretical assumption, as in the case of excluding 
financials and utilities. For running the regressions well-established statistical software such as 
Stata and Eviews were used. 
When retrieving data from Capital IQ for cash flow statements, income statement and balance 
sheets an extensive amount of data has been manually extracted between different excel 
spreadsheets, which is subject to the human error. To minimize the risk of errors the data have 
been double checked numerous times to make sure of the correctness of the data. 
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4. Empirical Findings 
This chapter contain the empirical outcome of the study. First, descriptive statistics is presented 
for the subgroups as well as for the whole sample. Second, the results from difference-in-
difference test and Abadie and Imbens matching estimator test for the subgroups are presented. 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
The total sample includes 591 companies including 8274 observations per variable. The 
descriptive statistics is presented both for the whole sample as well as for the five subgroups: 
high leverage, high leverage bank dependent, small bank dependent, low leverage and high cash.   
4.1.1 Changes in Capital Expenditures During the Financial Crisis, Q3 2006 - Q1 2010. 
 
 
Firstly the changes in capital expenditures during the whole crisis were examined, thus the 
values from the last year of crisis compared to the values of the pre-crisis. For the whole sample 
the total decrease in capital expenditures from pre-crisis level to last year of crisis was -33.9% ( -
0,494 % of total assets). The high leverage category shows a decrease of – 43.4% (-0.700 % of 
The	  averages	  value	  for	  capital	  expenditures	  in	  relation	  to	  assets	  for	  the	  different	  periods	  of	  the	  crisis	  and	  for	  all	  subgroups	  as
	  well	  as	  for	  the	  whole	  sample.	  The	  p-­‐values	  from	  	  regular	  t-­‐tests	  are	  also	  presented.	  
Whole	  sample High	  leverage High	  leverage Small Low	  leverage High	  cash
bank	  dependent bank	  dependent
Crisis	  period	  averages
1.	  Precrisis	  (2006Q3-­‐2007Q2 0,01456 0,01613 0,01588 0,01229 0,01294 0,01165
2.	  First	  year	  of	  crisis	  (2007Q3-­‐2008Q2) 0,01450 0,01587 0,01573 0,01371 0,01052 0,01071
3.	  Post-­‐Lehman	  (2008Q3-­‐2009Q1) 0,01205 0,01233 0,01217 0,01242 0,01044 0,00983
4.	  Last	  year	  of	  crisis	  (2009Q2-­‐2010Q1) 0,00962 0,00913 0,00876 0,00754 0,01052 0,01048
Difference	  (2-­‐1) -­‐0,00007 -­‐0,00026 -­‐0,00015 0,00142 -­‐0,00243 -­‐0,00093
P-­‐value	  for	  t-­‐test 0,90887 0,83727 0,90690 0,39973 0,20301 0,66605
Diffeerence	  (4-­‐1) -­‐0,00494 -­‐0,00700 -­‐0,00712 -­‐0,00475 -­‐0,00242 -­‐0,00116
P-­‐value	  for	  t-­‐test 0,00000 0,00000 0,00000 0,00005 0,33839 0,71784
Post-­‐Lehman	  versus	  pre-­‐Lehman
2009	  Q1 0,01038 0,01069 0,01050 0,00943 0,00950 0,00838
2008	  Q3 0,01428 0,01352 0,01375 0,01445 0,01219 0,01113
Difference	  (2009Q1-­‐2008Q3) -­‐0,00390 -­‐0,00283 -­‐0,00325 -­‐0,00503 -­‐0,00269 -­‐0,00275
p-­‐value	  for	  t-­‐test 0,00000 0,00370 0,00118 0,06845 0,02223 0,03603
Table	  1:	  Quartely	  capital	  expenditures	  during	  the	  crisis
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total assets) and the high leverage bank dependent had a decrease of -44.8% (-0.712 % of total 
assets). For small bank dependent the change decrease is -38.5% (-0.475 % of total assets). The 
low leverage category shows a decrease of – 18.7% (-0.242 % of total assets) whereas the high 
cash firms shows a decrease of -10% (-0.116 of total assets).  The first four groups have strong 
statistical significance (1 % level), whereas the low leverage and high cash is insignificant.  
The period between Q3 2008 to Q1 2009 is of extra interest since it can be seen as the epicentre 
of the crisis following the Lehman crash. The impact on investment during this period is 
noticeable high, where the whole samples capital expenditures dropped -27.3% (-0.390 % of 
total assets) during a period of 9 months. The high leverage firm cut their investment with -
20.9% (-0.283% of total assets) and high leverage bank dependent with -23.6% (-0.325% of total 
assets). The small bank dependent firm cut their capital expenditure the most with -34.7% (-
0.503% of total assets).  For low leverage firms the investment decreased -22,1% (-0.269% of 
total assets) whereas the high cash firms investments dropped -24.7% (-0.275% percentage 
units). All of these findings are statistically significant on levels between 1% and 10%. 
The changes between the first year of crisis and pre-crisis years had no statistical significance 
and with small changes in investments. 
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4.1.2 Changes in Net Debt Issuance During the Financial Crisis, Q3 2006 - Q1 2010.  
 
 
Examining how debt issuance changes during the crisis, thus the values from the last year of 
crisis compared to the values of the pre-crisis. For the whole sample the total decrease in debt 
issuance during the period was -169% (-1.568% of total assets). The high leverage category 
shows a decrease of – 253% (-1.979% of total assets) and the high leverage bank dependent 
shows a decrease of -255% (-1.911 % of total assets). For small bank dependent the decrease is -
196% (.0,582% of total assets). The low leverage category shows a decrease of – 106% (-1.577% 
of total assets) whereas the high cash firms have an increase of 20% (0,054% of total assets). The 
whole sample, high leverage and high leverage bank dependent were significant at 1 % level, 
low leverage at 5 %, whereas the small bank dependent and high cash are statistically 
insignificant. 
The period between Q3 2008 to Q1 2009 is of extra interest since it can be seen as one of the 
most critical periods of the crisis following the Lehman crash. The impact on debt issuance 
during this period was strikingly high, where the whole samples debt issuance dropped -263% (-
1.933% of total assets) during this 9 month period. The high leverage decreased their debt 
issuance with -298% (-5.485% of total assets) and high leverage bank dependent with -307% (-
The	  averages	  value	  for	  net	  debt	  issuance	  in	  relation	  to	  assets	  for	  the	  different	  periods	  of	  the	  crisis	  and	  for	  all	  subgroups	  as
	  well	  as	  for	  the	  whole	  sample.	  The	  p-­‐values	  from	  	  regular	  t-­‐tests	  are	  also	  presented.	  
Whole	  sample High	  leverage High	  leverage Small Low	  leverage High	  cash
bank	  dependent bank	  dependent
Crisis	  period	  averages
1.	  Precrisis	  (2006Q3-­‐2007Q2 0,00975 0,00783 0,00750 0,00299 0,01487 0,00105
2.	  First	  year	  of	  crisis	  (2007Q3-­‐2008Q2) 0,00653 0,00587 0,00724 0,00623 0,00259 0,00074
3.	  Post-­‐Lehman	  (2008Q3-­‐2009Q1) -­‐0,00229 -­‐0,01642 -­‐0,01841 -­‐0,01073 0,00410 0,00072
4.	  Last	  year	  of	  crisis	  (2009Q2-­‐2010Q1) -­‐0,00593 -­‐0,01196 -­‐0,01161 -­‐0,00283 -­‐0,00090 0,00159
Difference	  (2-­‐1) -­‐0,00322 -­‐0,00196 -­‐0,00026 0,00323 -­‐0,01229 -­‐0,00031
P-­‐value	  for	  t-­‐test 0,20504 0,69063 0,95851 0,51042 0,08302 0,94349
Diffeerence	  (4-­‐1) -­‐0,01568 -­‐0,01979 -­‐0,01911 -­‐0,00582 -­‐0,01577 0,00054
P-­‐value	  for	  t-­‐test 0,00000 0,00000 0,00000 0,22089 0,03892 0,88574
Post-­‐Lehman	  versus	  pre-­‐Lehman
2009	  Q1 -­‐0,01199 -­‐0,03644 -­‐0,03925 -­‐0,04485 -­‐0,00196 -­‐0,00234
2008	  Q3 0,00735 0,01841 0,01896 -­‐0,00330 0,00486 0,00336
Difference	  (2009Q1-­‐2008Q3) -­‐0,01933 -­‐0,05485 -­‐0,05821 -­‐0,04155 -­‐0,00682 -­‐0,00570
p-­‐value	  for	  t-­‐test 0,00060 0,01919 0,01864 0,19538 0,33230 0,12173
Table	  2:	  Quarterly	  net	  debt	  issuance	  during	  the	  crisis
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5.821% of total assets). The small bank dependent firms decreased lendings with –1259% (-
4.155% of total assets).  For low leverage firm the lendings decreased -140% (-0.682% of total 
assets) whereas the high cash firms investments dropped -170 % (-0.570 % of total assets). The 
changes in net debt issuance for in this period was significant at the 1% level for the whole 
sample, the 5% level for high leverage and high leverage bank dependent, but was insignificant 
for the rest of the groups.  
The change between first year of crisis and pre-crisis shows a general small decline in debt 
issuance, but these values are insignificant except for the low leverage firms. 
 
4.1.3 Changes in Net Equity Issuance During the Financial Crisis, Q3 2006 - Q1 2010. 
 
 
Examining how net equity issuance changes during the crisis, thus the values from the last year 
of crisis compared to the values of the pre-crisis. For the whole sample the total decrease in net 
equity issuance during the period was -7.07% (-0.039% of total assets). The high leverage 
category shows an increase of 79.4% (0.373% of total assets) and the high leverage bank 
dependent had a decrease of -4.4% (-0.014% of total assets). For small bank dependent the 
increase was 7.04% (0.082% of total assets). The low leverage category showed a decrease of -
47.4% (-0.272% of total assets) whereas the high cash firms had an increase of 3,80% 
The	  averages	  value	  for	  equity	  issuance	  in	  relation	  to	  assets	  for	  the	  different	  periods	  of	  the	  crisis	  and	  for	  all	  subgroups	  as
	  well	  as	  for	  the	  whole	  sample.	  The	  p-­‐values	  from	  	  regular	  t-­‐tests	  are	  also	  presented.	  
Whole	  sample High	  leverage High	  leverage Small Low	  leverage High	  cash
bank	  dependent bank	  dependent
Crisis	  period	  averages
1.	  Precrisis	  (2006Q3-­‐2007Q2 0,00552 0,00471 0,00318 0,01164 0,00576 0,00894
2.	  First	  year	  of	  crisis	  (2007Q3-­‐2008Q2) -0,00072 0,00660 0,00766 0,00386 0,00201 0,00565
3.	  Post-­‐Lehman	  (2008Q3-­‐2009Q1) -0,00290 -0,00064 -0,00067 -0,01396 -0,00203 0,00066
4.	  Last	  year	  of	  crisis	  (2009Q2-­‐2010Q1) 0,00513 0,00845 0,00304 0,01246 0,00303 0,00928
Difference	  (2-­‐1) -0,00624 0,00189 0,00448 -0,00779 -0,00374 -0,00328
P-­‐value	  for	  t-­‐test 0,00749 0,75454 0,47765 0,09834 0,52297 0,65161
Difference	  (3-­‐1) -0,00842 -0,00535 -0,00385 -0,02561 -0,00779 -0,00828
P-­‐value	  for	  t-­‐test 0,00270 0,42845 0,70781 0,00020 0,27957 0,34156
Diffeerence	  (4-­‐1) -0,00039 0,00373 -0,00014 0,00082 -0,00272 0,00034
P-­‐value	  for	  t-­‐test 0,86074 0,53206 0,33746 0,86931 0,66401 0,96258
Table	  3:	  Quartely	  net	  equity	  issuance	  during	  the	  crisis
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(0,00034% of total assets).  No changes in the last year versus pre-crisis period show a statistical 
significance.  
The post-Lehman period shows a statistical significance for changes in net equity issuance for 
the whole group and small bank dependent. The impact on net equity issuance during this period 
was high, where the whole samples net equity issuance dropped -152.54% (-0.842% of total 
assets). The high leverage firm cut their net equity issuance with -135,88% (-0.535% of total 
assets) and high leverage bank dependent with -4.40% (-0.00385% of total assets). The small 
bank dependent firm cut their net equity issuance the most with -219,93% (-2.561% of total 
assets).  For low leverage firm the equity issuance decreased -135,24 % (-0.779% of total assets) 
whereas the high cash firms equity issuance dropped -92.62% (-0.828% of total assets). The 
results indicate that equity issuance was highly affected by the Lehman bankruptcy period and 
started to reach the same levels of equity issuance during the last year as they was before the 
crisis, but due to the missing significance this indication should be observed with caution.  
The changes between the first year of crisis and pre-crisis years were only significance for the 
whole sample and small bank dependent firms. The whole sample had a drop in equity issuance 
of -113.04% (-0.624% of total assets) and small bank dependent firms had a decrease of -66.84% 
(-0.779% of total assets). 
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4.1.4 Changes in Cash Holdings During the Financial Crisis, Q3 2006 - Q1 2010.  
 
 
 
Examining how cash holdings changes during the crisis, thus the values from the last year of 
crisis compared to the values of the pre-crisis. For the whole sample the total decrease in cash 
holdings during the period was -10% (-1.557% of total assets). The high leverage category had a 
decrease of -9% (-0.649% of total assets) and the high leverage bank dependent had a decrease 
of -11% (-0.902% of total assets). For small bank dependent the change decrease is -12% (-2.860 
% of total assets). The low leverage category shows a decrease of -13% (-3.686% of total assets) 
whereas the high cash firms show a decrease -16% (-6.083% of total assets).  The whole sample 
and the high cash firms were significant at the 1% level, the small bank dependent and low 
leverage on 10% level and whereas the high leverage and high leverage bank dependent shows 
insignificant results. Comparing the first year of the crisis and the pre-crisis there is a small 
decrease in cash holdings, but these changes are only statistically significant for the whole 
sample and that on the 1% level. 
 
The	  averages	  value	  for	  cash	  holdings	  in	  relation	  to	  assets	  for	  the	  different	  periods	  of	  the	  crisis	  and	  for	  all	  subgroups	  as
	  well	  as	  for	  the	  whole	  sample.	  The	  p-­‐values	  from	  	  regular	  t-­‐tests	  are	  also	  presented.	  
Whole	  sample High	  leverage High	  leverage Small Low	  leverage High	  cash
bank	  dependent bank	  dependent
Crisis	  period	  averages
1.	  Precrisis	  (2006Q3-­‐2007Q2 0,15617 0,08015 0,08149 0,23476 0,28586 0,38956
2.	  First	  year	  of	  crisis	  (2007Q3-­‐2008Q2) 0,14504 0,07206 0,07332 0,22072 0,26638 0,36721
3.	  Post-­‐Lehman	  (2008Q3-­‐2009Q1) 0,13706 0,06470 0,05757 0,20594 0,26139 0,35601
4.	  Last	  year	  of	  crisis	  (2009Q2-­‐2010Q1) 0,14061 0,07366 0,07246 0,20616 0,24900 0,32873
Difference	  (2-­‐1) -­‐0,01113 -­‐0,00809 -­‐0,00817 -­‐0,01404 -­‐0,01948 -­‐0,02235
P-­‐value	  for	  t-­‐test 0,08875 0,27138 0,28974 0,42761 0,30523 0,30840
Diffeerence	  (4-­‐1) -­‐0,01557 -­‐0,00649 -­‐0,00902 -­‐0,02860 -­‐0,03686 -­‐0,06083
P-­‐value	  for	  t-­‐test 0,00989 0,34282 0,20263 0,09541 0,05431 0,00329
Post-­‐Lehman	  versus	  pre-­‐Lehman
2009	  Q1 0,13673 0,06493 0,05742 0,20673 0,25729 0,35871
2008	  Q3 0,13475 0,06759 0,05929 0,19585 0,25055 0,35678
Difference	  (2009Q1-­‐2008Q3) 0,00198 -­‐0,00266 -­‐0,00187 0,01089 0,00674 0,00193
p-­‐value	  for	  t-­‐test 0,48521 0,58078 0,71134 0,16307 0,37992 0,87359
Table	  4:	  Quartely	  cash	  holdings	  during	  the	  crisis
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4.2 Regressions 
In this section the results from the two regression models used. The Abadie and Imbens matching 
estimators and the difference-in-difference estimators have been created to create corresponding 
results. The difference is that the Abadie and Imbens matching estimators is matched against a 
control group created by matching variables whereas the difference-in-difference uses the rest of 
the whole sample as the control group which should account for the difference in the output 
estimates. When making references to the two different methods, the treatment group will be the 
same for both methods, both the control group for the difference-in-difference group will be 
referred to as “rest of whole sample” whereas the matching estimators control group will be 
referred to as “matching firms” The regressions on equity issuance is not tabulated, this because 
no of the regression outputs were significant and thus not fit for use in the analysis. Instead all 
analysis is made of out of the mean values of equity issuance. The statistical significance of each 
test is stated after the number in the tables, where 3 stars indicate a significance of 1 % level, 2 
stars indicate a significance of 5 %, 1 indicate a significance of 10 %, and no stars indicate no 
statistical significance. In general the significance rises as later periods was compared against the 
pre-crisis period. 1 
                                                
1 All of the subgroups are not presented for all of the dependent variables (capital expenditures, debt issuance and 
cash holdings). We only choose to present the subgroups that are relevant in order to be able to answer our research 
questions.  
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4.2.1 Capital Expenditures 
 
The regression-analysis shows no statistical significance for the first year of crisis compared to 
the pre-crisis level. But both regression models indicate movements in the same direction. High 
leverage, high leverage bank dependent, low leverage and high cash cuts investments compared 
to matching firms and the rest of whole sample. Whereas the small bank dependent invested 
more than both the whole sample and matching firms.   
To capture the development of the crisis further regressions were made for the post-Lehman 
period, compared to pre-crisis period. The regression indicate that high leverage and high 
leverage bank dependent firms further cut their capital expenditures compared to the rest of the 
whole sample and the matching firms as the crisis progressed, but this is not statistically 
significant. Surprisingly the small bank dependent firms continued to cut their investment less 
than matching firms and statistically significantly less than the rest of whole sample. Low 
leverage firm cut investments little more than the rest of the whole sample but less than matching 
firms whereas high cash firms cut less than rest of whole sample and more than matching firms.  
During the last year of crisis, compared to pre-crisis, there are more significant regressions. High 
leverage firms cut investment more statistically, more than both the rest of whole sample and 
matching firms. This is true also for high leverage bank dependent firms, but it is not statistically 
significant for the comparison against matching estimators. The small bank dependent firms have 
High	  leverage High	  leverage Small Low	  leverage High	  cash
bank	  dependent bank	  dependent
DiD -­‐0,00024 -­‐0,00024 0,00172 -­‐0,00267 -­‐0,00094
Matching	  	  estimators -­‐0,00005 -­‐0,00060 0,00229 -­‐0,00064 -­‐0,00008
Nr	  of	  firms 591 591 591 591 591
DiD -­‐0,00159 -­‐0,00165 0,003050* -­‐0,00010 0,00075
Matching	  estimator -­‐0,00090 -­‐0,00155 0,00206 0,00180 -­‐0,00083
Nr	  of	  firms 591 591 591 591 591
DID -­‐0,002775** -­‐0,002743** 0,00021 0,002732* 0,004102**
Matching	  estimator -­‐0,0625217** -­‐0,00231 -­‐0,00336 0,00236 0,00255
Nr	  of	  firms 591 591 591 591 591
Precrisis	  (2006Q3-­‐2007Q2)	  versus	  first	  year	  (2007Q3-­‐2008Q2)
Precrisis	  (2006Q3-­‐2007Q2)	  versus	  post-­‐Lehman	  (2008Q4-­‐2009Q1)
Precrisis	  (2006Q3-­‐2007Q2)	  versus	  last	  year	  (2009Q2-­‐2010Q1)
Table	  5:	  Quartely	  Capital	  expenditures	  during	  the	  crisis
Estimates	  of	  the	  changes	  is	  average	  quarterly	  capital	  expenditures	  divided	  by	  total	  assets.	  The	  difference-­‐in-­‐difference	  results	  of
	  the	  matching	  approach	  used	  by	  Almeida,	  Campello,	  Laranjeira	  and	  Weisbenner	  (2012).	  Matching	  estimator	  (ATT)	  is	  the	  
Abadie-­‐Imbens	  bias	  corrected	  average	  treatment	  effects.	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no statistically significant differences. The difference between small bank dependent firms and 
the rest of the whole sample is economically insignificant whereas when comparing to the 
matching firms they cut investments more. Both the low leverage and high leverage firms 
lowered their capital expenditure statistically significantly less than whole sample and there is 
also an indication that they cut capital expenditures less than matching firms. 
4.2.2 Net Debt Issuance 
 
 
The regressions indicate that high leverage firms issue less debt than the rest of whole sample, 
and matching firms except for the first year of crisis compared to pre-crisis where they issue 
more debt than matching firms. High leverage bank dependent firms issue more debt than both 
the rest of the whole sample and statistically significant (10 % level) for matching firms for the 
first year of crisis compared to pre-crisis. For the post-Lehman and the last year of crisis, 
compared to pre-crisis level, high leverage bank dependent firms issue more than matching firm 
with significance of 5 % respectively 1 %. Although the regressions also indicate that they issue 
less than then rest of whole sample for these two periods. The regressions indicate that small 
bank dependent firms issue more than both the rest of the whole sample and matching firms 
Estimates	  of	  the	  changes	  is	  average	  net	  debt	  issuance	  divided	  by	  total	  assets.	  The	  difference-­‐in-­‐difference	  results	  of
	  the	  matching	  approach	  used	  by	  Almeida,	  Campello,	  Laranjeira	  and	  Weisbenner	  (2012).	  Matching	  estimator	  (ATT)	  is	  the	  
Abadie-­‐Imbens	  bias	  corrected	  average	  treatment	  effects.	  
High	  leverage High	  leverage Small Low	  leverage
bank	  dependent bank	  dependent
DiD 0,001557 0,003616 0,007459 -0,009592
Matching	  	  estimators -0,002471 0,0257304* 0,010024 0,0026513
Nr	  of	  firms 591 591 591 591
DiD -0,015061 -0,017338* -0,001932 0,007201
Matching	  estimator -0,0113343 0,0514433** 0,0139812 -0,0156136*
Nr	  of	  firms 591 591 591 591
DID -0,005069 -0,00416 0,011400 0,0044
Matching	  estimator -0,0036402 0,071565*** 0,0098336 -0,0042633
Nr	  of	  observations 591 591 591 591
Table	  6:	  Quarterly	  net	  debt	  issuance	  during	  the	  crisis
Precrisis	  (2006Q3-­‐2007Q2)	  versus	  first	  year	  (2007Q3-­‐2008Q2)
Precrisis	  (2006Q3-­‐2007Q2)	  versus	  post-­‐Lehman	  (2008Q4-­‐2009Q1)
Precrisis	  (2006Q3-­‐2007Q2)	  versus	  last	  year	  (2009Q2-­‐2010Q1)
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except for the post-Lehman period compared to pre-crisis where they issue less than rest of the 
sample. Low leverage firms only have significant results for post-Lehman period, compared to 
pre-crisis where they issue significantly less than matching firms, otherwise they show mixed 
results. 
4.2.3 Cash Holdings 
 
The regressions indicate, but show no statistical significance, that high leverage and high 
leverage bank dependent use less cash than both whole sample and matching firms for all periods 
compared to both the rest of the whole sample and matching firms. The small bank dependent 
firms use less cash than both the rest of the sample and the matching firms for all periods except 
for pre-crisis to first year of crisis where matching firms use more cash, though these findings are 
not significant. Low leverage firm use less cash for all periods than the rest of the whole sample, 
but less than the matching firms. These findings are significant on the 5 % level for the matching 
estimator regressions of last year of crisis compared to pre-crisis and for post-Lehman compared 
to pre-crisis. High cash firms use more cash than the both rest of whole sample and matching 
firm, these findings are for the last year of crisis compared with pre-crisis significant on 5 % 
level for the difference-in-difference  and 1 % level for matching estimators. 
 
 
High	  leverage High	  leverage Small Low	  leverage High	  cash
bank	  dependent bank	  dependent
DiD 0,003749 0,003612 -0,003361 -0,003059 -0,012189
Matching	  	  estimators 0,0373659 0,031258 0,0072541 0,0241251 -0,0257218
Nr	  of	  firms 591 591 591 591 591
DiD 0,004524 0,003731 -0,01121 -0,006028 -0,015686
Matching	  estimator 0,060916 0,0629625 -0,0086526 0,0550313** -0,049017
Nr	  of	  firms 591 591 591 591 591
DID 0,011155 0,004565 -0,01456 -0,022627 -0,052854**
Matching	  estimator 0,0719514 0,0736748 -0,0302454 0,0608474** -0,093601***
Nr	  of	  observations 591 591 591 591 591
Estimates	  of	  the	  changes	  is	  average	  quarterly	  cash	  holdings	  divided	  by	  total	  assets.	  The	  difference-­‐in-­‐difference	  results	  of
	  the	  matching	  approach	  used	  by	  Almeida,	  Campello,	  Laranjeira	  and	  Weisbenner	  (2012).	  Matching	  estimator	  (ATT)	  is	  the	  
Abadie-­‐Imbens	  bias	  corrected	  average	  treatment	  effects.	  
Precrisis	  (2006Q3-­‐2007Q2)	  versus	  first	  year	  (2007Q3-­‐2008Q2)
Precrisis	  (2006Q3-­‐2007Q2)	  versus	  post-­‐Lehman	  (2008Q4-­‐2009Q1)
Precrisis	  (2006Q3-­‐2007Q2)	  versus	  last	  year	  (2009Q2-­‐2010Q1)
Table	  7:	  Quartely	  cash	  holdings	  during	  the	  crisis
 46 
 
5. Analysis 
The empirical findings from last chapter will be discussed and analysed. An analysis of if there is 
evidence for the different theories presented in chapter 2. There will also be a comparison 
between our results and earlier research. 
5.1 Are Bank-dependent Firm’s Investment Activities More Sensitive to 
a Bank Lending and Credit Supply Shock? 
In the context of bank dependency, two groups were investigated, high leverage bank dependent 
firms and small bank dependent firms. The high leverage bank dependent group is similar to the 
high leverage group, but for the bank dependency factor as distinction. Since the high leverage 
bank dependent group is affected both because it is highly leverage and because of it is bank 
dependent, this distinction between the groups is useful. But the difference between the two 
groups are economically as well as statistically insignificant, which means it is hard to derive any 
conclusion from the material. The only conclusion possible to make is that it seems to be no 
difference between bank-dependent firms and non-bank dependent firms. 
The other bank dependent group is the small bank dependent firms which decreased their capital 
expenditures with -38.5% (-0.475% of total assets) comparing the last year of crisis to the pre-
crisis level, whereas the whole sample had a lower decline from pre-crisis level of -33.9% (-
0.494% of total assets). The small bank dependent also lowered their debt issuance more than the 
whole firm with -196% (-0.582% of total assets) compared to -169% (-1.568% of total assets).  
The regressions indicate that small bank dependent firms where less impacted than both 
matching firms and rest of the whole sample, although this is only significant against the rest of 
the whole sample for the post-Lehman period compared to pre-crisis level. These empirical 
findings contradict the bank-lending theory, in which firms with bank-dependency should be 
more affected. This is in conflict with the research of Buca and Vermeulen (2012) which shows 
that bank-lending firms were more affected during the crisis. It is also in conflict with Slovin, 
Sushka and Polonchek, (1993) which implies that bank dependent firms should be more affected, 
because a substitution of debt from the relationship bank to an alternative source would lead to a 
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premium paid on the new financing source. This is because firms with no previous credit rating, 
and thus access to public market, should have difficulties to substitute bank loans to bond loans, 
as firms with access to bond markets did during the crisis according to Iver, Lopes, Peydró and 
Schoar (2010), Adrain, Colla and Shin (2012) and Becker and Ivashina (2012).  Previous 
research also show that small firms are more affected in times of tighter credit, meaning that the 
small factor characteristic of the group should not be the explanatory factor why small bank 
dependent firm seems to be less affected (Gertler & Gilchrist, 1993). 
According to the bank lending supply shock theory, a bank dependent firm should be more 
affected than a non-bank dependent firm, this is however not true, which has been established in 
previous empirical research. Dewally and Shao (2013) shows that bank dependent firm actually 
lower debt less than other firms, which is in line with the indications of our empirical findings, 
where the regressions indicate that small bank dependent firms actually cut debt issuance less 
than both matching firms and the rest of the sample for all three investigated periods. Neither the 
studies by Kahle and Stulz (2010) or Kahle and Stulz (2013) could prove that bank dependent 
firms are more affected than other firms.  
A review of the descriptive statistics indicate that equity issuance actually declined during the 
period post-Lehman compared to pre-crisis level, which is in conflict with the research of Leary 
(2009) which states firms substitutes reduced bank lending for equity issuance  
5.2 Are High Leverage Firms Investment Activities More Sensitive to 
Credit Supply Shock? 
The two categories of highly levered firms are high leverage and the high leverage bank 
dependent. But since the high leverage bank dependent only is a refined version of the high 
leverage, where firms without bank-dependency have been excluded, there is of no analytical 
value to assess the both of them under this research question.  
Comparing the last year of crisis to the pre-crisis level, the high leverage firms experienced a, on 
the 1% significance level, decrease in capital expenditures compared of -43.4% (-0.700% of total 
assets). This was greater than the whole sample which had a decline of -33.9% (-0.494% of total 
assets), and also greater than all the non-high leverage categories. These descriptive statistics 
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indicates that high leverage firms cut their investments more than other firms. The regressions 
further show that high leverage firms, on the 5 % significance level, lowered investment more 
than both the rest of whole sample and the matching firms when looking at the last year of crisis 
compared to the pre-crisis period. The first period and the post-Lehman period compared to pre-
crisis period the regressions also indicate that high leverage firms invest less, but this is not 
statistically significant. These findings are coherent with the credit supply shock theory where 
highly leveraged firms were predicted to be more affected than other firms. This is also in line 
with what Buca and Vermeulen (2012) found in their studies of European firms, where they 
showed that high leverage firms reduced their capital expenditures significantly more than firms 
with lower leverage. Kahle and Stulz’s (2013) empirical findings on the US market surprisingly 
contradict a supply shock when they showed that highly leverage firms where actually less 
impacted than matching firms. The thesis findings combined with the previous research implies 
that there could be a difference in how leverage firms in US and European market reacts to credit 
supply shocks, but this is out of the scope because the thesis provides no analytical framework to 
explain why these geographical differences occur. The results are also corresponding to the 
prediction of the amplifier effect, where more leveraged firms where predicted to be more 
affected, (Kahle & Stulz, 2013).   
If the changes in capital expenditure is actually due to a credit supply shock, the empirical 
findings should first and foremost show that a credit supply shock was present and secondly that 
high leverage firms were more affected than other firms.  
The descriptive statistics show that there was a large credit supply shock, where the mean values 
of debt issuance for the highly leveraged firms decreased with -253% (-1.979% of total assets) 
compared to pre-crisis level, which was significant on the on 1 % level. This is considerably 
greater than for the whole sample of -169% (-1.567% of total assets) which is a clear indication 
that high leverage firms were more affected than the whole sample. However the regressions 
cannot with statistical significance confirm this. The regressions can though indicate that higher 
leveraged firms are more affected when compared to both the rest of whole sample and matching 
firms for all periods, except for matching when comparing first year of crisis to pre-crisis levels. 
Research from the US also indicate that highly leveraged firms had a higher decrease in debt 
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issuance than other firms, but this is only significant when comparing post-Lehman period to 
pre-crisis period (Kahle & Stulz, 2013) 
The highly leverage firms also have lower cash holdings than other firms prior to the crisis, 
implying that that they are less able to use cash holdings to finance investments. Both the mean 
values and regressions indicate that high leverage firms substitute debt for exhaustion of cash to 
a lesser extent than other types of firms. This indicate that high leverage firms cannot, to the 
same extent, use cash holdings as a hedge for credit supply shocks as Almeida, Campello and 
Weisbach (2004) show that firms in general do in order to mitigate a credit supply crisis. 
The characteristics of the high leverage group where firms also have low cash holdings 
according to our descriptive statistics is the group where it is most likely to find financially 
constrained firms during a credit supply shock. Since high leverage firms are the firms which 
experience the largest cut in capital expenditures, these findings are homogeneous with the 
survey of Campello, Graham and Harvey (2010) which showed that financial constraint firms cut 
their investment the most. 
5.3 Are Firms with Higher Cash Holdings Less Sensitive to a Credit 
Supply Shock? 
High cash firms had a decrease in capital expenditures of -10% (-0.116% of total assets) when 
comparing the last year of crisis to pre-crisis level, which is the smallest drop of all groups. In 
relation to the whole sample, the decrease was considerably smaller. The decrease for the 
average firm during the financial crisis was -33.9% (-0. 494% of total assets). The changes in 
mean values are not significant, except for post-Lehman compared to pre-Lehman, which is 
related to the fact that the changes in capital expenditures for high cash firms were so small. The 
regression output indicate, without significance, that high cash firms invested slightly less than 
the rest of the sample and matching firms for the first year of crisis in comparison to pre-crisis 
level. For post-Lehman period compared to pre-crisis, the high cash firms started to invest more 
than the rest of the sample but still less than matching firms.  For the full period, last year of 
crisis compared to the pre-crisis year the findings were fully in line with the credit supply shocks 
prediction, where high cash invested more than  matching firms and significantly  more than the 
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rest of whole sample . The overall findings indicate that high cash firms cut their investments 
less than other firms as predicted by credit supply theories, but not with any statistical 
significance.  These results are also similar to what Kahle and Stulz (2013) found in the US, 
where high cash firms were less affected than other firms.  
The empirical findings tend to correspond to the empirical findings of Duchin, Ozbas and Sensoy 
(2010), but without statistically significance, which also show that high cash firms generally cut 
expenditures less than other firms. The finding that cash holdings matters is a breakdown of one 
of the assumptions of the Modigliani and Miller (1958) theorem. Their assumption states that 
markets are frictionless, which could only be true if cash holdings would not matter.  
As seen in table 4, the high cash firms burned through the most cash during the crisis where their 
cash holdings of total assets declined, statistically significant, with 6,083 of percentage units, 
which is four times the average amount of the whole sample. This supports Almeida, Campello 
and Weisbach (2004) research that firms use cash holdings as a hedge in the presence of a credit 
supply chock. Also, if firms, thanks to its cash holdings can make investments in valuable 
investment opportunities, which they could not do otherwise, hoarding up on cash prior to crisis 
can be beneficial as shown by Fazzari and Pettersen (1993) and Lin & Paravisini (2010). 
The results of the empirical study also indicate that high cash firm actually increased their debt 
issuance when comparing pre-crisis average with the last year of crisis averages, though these 
findings are not statistically significant. This is a small indication that firms, as earlier shown by 
Keynes (1936), Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009), Hugonnier, Malamud and Morellec (2014), 
hoards up on cash under uncertainty, because when struck by a crisis high cash firms decided to 
issue more debt than usual instead of burning through more of its high cash holdings, and that in 
times when debt is costly. 
5.4 Could Decline in Investments Be Explained by a Demand Shock? 
The level of investment is determined by access to finance as well as possibility to invest in 
valuable investment opportunities. The net debt issuance fell 33 % for the whole sample for the 
first year of crisis prior to pre-crisis level, but the fall was not statistically significant for this 
period. Comparing post-Lehman to pre-Lehman shows a statistically significant fall, and 
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comparing last year of crisis to pre-crisis level shows a significant decrease of 169 %. These 
empirical findings clearly are proof for a negative shock in credit supply. There are plenty of 
research that proves the presence of a credit supply shock where Almeida, Campello, Laranjeira 
and Weisbenner (2012), Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010), Brunnermeier (2009), Kahle and Stulz, 
(2013), Buca and Vermeulen (2012), Gorton (2010), Acharya, Philippon, Richardson and 
Roubini (2009) are among few. Kalemi-Ozxan and Kamil (2009) provide evidence that the 
reduction of credit supply was actually the key factor in constraining firms from investing and 
achieving growth in the aftermath of the financial crisis.  
The decrease in investment for the whole sample was economically and statistically insignificant 
for the first year of crisis compared to pre-crisis levels. During the post-Leman period compared 
to pre-Lehman the capital expenditures drop is statistically significant and comparing the last 
year of crisis to pre-crisis levels yields a statistically significant drop in investments of -33,9 %. 
The acceleration of the decrease in debt issuance and capital expenditures fit well, which 
indicates that a credit supply shock could be the leading factor driving the decrease in capital 
expenditures. 
The gross domestic product (GDP) is a good indicator of a negative demand shock of services 
and goods, since it is largely determined by the demand of services and goods (Birch Sørensen & 
Whitta-Jacobsen, 2010). The GDP started according to Eurostat decline in Eurozone in 2008 and 
continued in recession for over a year. The problem is to gauge what came first, the chicken or 
the egg? In general large credit supply shock is followed by a negative shock in credit supply. 
But the methodological framework did not yield any results of statistical significance which 
enables any analysis of the effect that the different shocks had on GDP. 
But there is a clear indication that not only a credit supply shock was present, but also a demand 
shock of services and goods. This is also proved by articles of Mian and Sufi (2010), Mian, Rao 
and Sufi (2011), and Mian and Sufi (2012) which shows that a demand shock of services and 
goods were present, and also describes it in the context of investment activities. Bakke (2009) 
implies that the credit supply shock only had a small part of the effect on investment activities, 
leaving space for other factors such as a negative demand shock of services and goods. 
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The empirical findings and the previous empirical research shows that both a negative credit 
supply shock and a negative shock in demand of goods and services were present during the 
period studied. This means that firms investment activities were impacted both by access to 
finance which prevented them from pursuing profitable investment opportunities, but there was 
also a negative demand shock of services and goods which made the investment opportunities 
less profitable. 
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6. Conclusions 
6.1 Summary and discussion 
The purpose of this study was to research how the financial crisis of 2007 and 2008 affected 
firms financing and investing activities. The thesis applies a methodology using a difference-in-
differences estimator and the Abadie and Imbens bias-corrected matching estimator. The aim of 
the study was further specified to four research questions, created to test theories and previous 
empirical findings: Are bank-dependent firm’s investment activities more Sensitive to a bank 
lending and credit supply shock? Are highly leverage firms investment activities more sensitive 
to credit supply shock? Are firms with higher cash holdings less sensitive to a credit supply 
shock? Could the decline in investments be explained by a demand shock of services and goods?   
The thesis found that bank-dependent firms were not more sensitive to a bank lending and credit 
supply shock compared to other firms, if anything, they are less affected. This is in conflict with 
the bank-lending theory which predicted that bank dependent firms should be more affected than 
other firms. Previous research display varying results, on one hand some research show that bank 
dependent firms are more affected, and on the other hand that they are less affected, leading to 
contradictory evidence. The results are in line with what Dewally and Shao (2013), Kahle and 
Stulz (2010) and Kahle and Stulz (2013) found. A possible explanation as to why the predictions 
of the bank lending supply could be misleading is the fact that it could be beneficial to be part of 
a bank relationship. The relationship could have countercyclical properties, where the banks 
extensive knowledge about a firm might lead them to support the firm financial, beyond what the 
current form of bank lending supply shock predicts. 
The empirical findings of the high leverage are homogeneous with the credit supply shock, and 
show with 5 % statistical significance, that high leverage firms cut investments more than the 
rest of the whole sample and matching firms when comparing the last year of crisis to pre-crisis 
levels. These findings are in line with research of Buca and Vermeulen (2012) but contradicts 
that high leverage firm were less affected, which Kahle and Stulz (2013) surprisingly found in 
their research. 
The empirical findings indicate that high cash firms overall were less affected during the crisis.  
Comparing the last year of crisis to pre-crisis level the high cash firms are significant less 
 54 
 
affected than the rest of the sample, which is in line with the predictions of credit supply shock. 
This finding is coherent with other researchers, such as Duchin, Ozbas and Sensoy (2010), Kahle 
and Stulz (2013) find. This means that holding excess cash for precautionary reasons are 
valuable, since it prolongs the real options. Where firms with high cash holdings can choose to 
pursuit valuable investment opportunities to a larger extent than firms without precautionary cash 
holdings. 
The statistically significance reduction in capital expenditure during the crisis could be explained 
by a combination of credit supply shock and a demand shock of services and goods. The 
empirical findings clearly show the presence of credit supply shock, which also have been 
proven by numerous other academics. The data of the thesis do not have any findings proving 
that a demand shock of services and goods occurred. But the negative development of the gross 
domestic product in Eurozone indicate a demand shock, which is also proven by researcher such 
as Mian and Sufi (2010), Mian, Rao and Sufi (2011), and Mian and Sufi (2012). 
6.2 Suggestion for future research 
The incoherent empirical findings in the subject of investing activities during credit supply 
shocks create an unmet demand, which can be clarified by further research.  The subject of 
access to financing and its effect on investment activities would benefit from a methodical 
framework which can gauge the casual effects of credit supply shock and the demand shock of 
goods and services and its affect gross domestic product. This would enable a more accurate 
analysis of the actual effect of the credit supply shock, which would be valuable for regulators 
and politicians when structuring bailout programs and quantitative easing. A study using similar 
methodology as this thesis, but with a larger sample, could also be contributing, if it can achieve 
greater statistical significance and therefore derive conclusions that this thesis only could point 
out as indications.  
There is a possibility that the discrepancy in previous research in some instances can be 
explained by geographical differences, which also could be a point of departure for future 
research. The previous research is often based on a dataset only consisting of public firms, which 
might not be representative for the corporate sector. Further research on non-public firms could 
add an extra dimension to the previous body of research. 
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8. Appendix 
Due to the large number of tests performed there are only around one third of them that are 
presented in the appendix. Focuses are on the tests performed on capital expenditures and the rest 
of the tests presented are randomly chosen.  
8.1 GDP-Eurozone 
Figure 1: GDP Eurozone (Source: Datastream) 
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8.2 Difference-in-Difference 
8.2.1 Pre-crisis versus first year 
Investments 
High leverage 
Dependent Variable: INVESTMENTS  
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/09/14   Time: 16:47   
Sample: 2006Q3 2008Q2   
Periods included: 8   
Cross-sections included: 590   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 4720  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     DUMMY -0.001931 0.001026 -1.882576 0.0598 
DUMMY_PREVSFIRST 2.04E-05 0.000632 0.032219 0.9743 
DGT 0.000236 0.001451 0.162652 0.8708 
C -0.014196 0.000447 -31.76575 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.001332     Mean dependent var -0.014530 
Adjusted R-squared 0.000696     S.D. dependent var 0.019548 
S.E. of regression 0.019541     Akaike info criterion -5.031711 
Sum squared resid 1.800891     Schwarz criterion -5.026236 
Log likelihood 11878.84     Hannan-Quinn criter. -5.029786 
F-statistic 2.096045     Durbin-Watson stat 1.125796 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.098555    
     
      
High leverage bank dependent 
Dependent Variable: INVESTMENTS  
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/09/14   Time: 16:51   
Sample: 2006Q3 2008Q2   
Periods included: 8   
Cross-sections included: 590   
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Total panel (balanced) observations: 4720  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     DUMMY -0.001607 0.001048 -1.533828 0.1251 
DUMMY_PREVSFIRST 4.69E-05 0.000628 0.074609 0.9405 
DGT 0.000102 0.001482 0.068657 0.9453 
C -0.014274 0.000444 -32.13326 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.000938     Mean dependent var -0.014530 
Adjusted R-squared 0.000303     S.D. dependent var 0.019548 
S.E. of regression 0.019545     Akaike info criterion -5.031317 
Sum squared resid 1.801600     Schwarz criterion -5.025843 
Log likelihood 11877.91     Hannan-Quinn criter. -5.029393 
F-statistic 1.476646     Durbin-Watson stat 1.125584 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.218773    
     
      
Small bank dependent 
Dependent Variable: INVESTMENTS  
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/09/14   Time: 16:52   
Sample: 2006Q3 2008Q2   
Periods included: 8   
Cross-sections included: 590   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 4720  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     DUMMY 0.002622 0.001181 2.219872 0.0265 
DUMMY_PREVSFIRST 0.000295 0.000611 0.482407 0.6295 
DGT -0.001716 0.001671 -1.027081 0.3044 
C -0.014914 0.000432 -34.50163 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.001171     Mean dependent var -0.014530 
Adjusted R-squared 0.000536     S.D. dependent var 0.019548 
S.E. of regression 0.019543     Akaike info criterion -5.031550 
Sum squared resid 1.801180     Schwarz criterion -5.026076 
Log likelihood 11878.46     Hannan-Quinn criter. -5.029626 
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F-statistic 1.843262     Durbin-Watson stat 1.126705 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.137025    
     
      
Debt Issuance 
High leverage 
Dependent Variable: DEBT_ISSUANCE  
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/09/14   Time: 16:56   
Sample: 2006Q3 2008Q2   
Periods included: 8   
Cross-sections included: 590   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 4714  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     DUMMY -0.002387 0.004583 -0.520811 0.6025 
DUMMY_PREVSFIRST -0.003520 0.002826 -1.245512 0.2130 
DGT 0.001557 0.006482 0.240224 0.8102 
C 0.010221 0.001998 5.114952 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.000406     Mean dependent var 0.008155 
Adjusted R-squared -0.000231     S.D. dependent var 0.087295 
S.E. of regression 0.087305     Akaike info criterion -2.037968 
Sum squared resid 35.90044     Schwarz criterion -2.032488 
Log likelihood 4807.491     Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.036042 
F-statistic 0.636940     Durbin-Watson stat 2.109790 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.591160    
     
      
High leverage bank dependent 
Dependent Variable: DEBT_ISSUANCE  
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/09/14   Time: 16:57   
Sample: 2006Q3 2008Q2   
Periods included: 8   
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Cross-sections included: 590   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 4714  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     DUMMY -0.002765 0.004682 -0.590668 0.5548 
DUMMY_PREVSFIRST -0.003874 0.002808 -1.379593 0.1678 
DGT 0.003616 0.006621 0.546181 0.5850 
C 0.010264 0.001986 5.169085 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.000422     Mean dependent var 0.008155 
Adjusted R-squared -0.000215     S.D. dependent var 0.087295 
S.E. of regression 0.087304     Akaike info criterion -2.037985 
Sum squared resid 35.89985     Schwarz criterion -2.032505 
Log likelihood 4807.530     Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.036058 
F-statistic 0.662911     Durbin-Watson stat 2.109552 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.574792    
     
      
Small bank dependent 
Dependent Variable: DEBT_ISSUANCE  
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/09/14   Time: 16:58   
Sample: 2006Q3 2008Q2   
Periods included: 8   
Cross-sections included: 590   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 4714  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     DUMMY -0.007822 0.005277 -1.482423 0.1383 
DUMMY_PREVSFIRST -0.004224 0.002732 -1.545767 0.1222 
DGT 0.007459 0.007462 0.999489 0.3176 
C 0.010816 0.001932 5.597871 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.000808     Mean dependent var 0.008155 
Adjusted R-squared 0.000172     S.D. dependent var 0.087295 
S.E. of regression 0.087287     Akaike info criterion -2.038371 
Sum squared resid 35.88598     Schwarz criterion -2.032891 
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Log likelihood 4808.441     Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.036445 
F-statistic 1.269921     Durbin-Watson stat 2.109927 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.282884    
     
      
8.2.2 Pre-crisis versus post-Lehman 
Investments 
High leverage 
Dependent Variable: INVESTMENTS  
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/09/14   Time: 21:02   
Sample: 2006Q3 2009Q1   
Periods included: 6   
Cross-sections included: 590   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 3540  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     DUMMY -0.001931 0.000921 -2.097034 0.0361 
DUMMY_PREVSLEHMA
N 0.002205 0.000695 3.173378 0.0015 
DGT 0.001594 0.001595 0.999435 0.3177 
C -0.014196 0.000401 -35.38441 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.005775     Mean dependent var -0.013727 
Adjusted R-squared 0.004932     S.D. dependent var 0.017586 
S.E. of regression 0.017543     Akaike info criterion -5.247194 
Sum squared resid 1.088228     Schwarz criterion -5.240220 
Log likelihood 9291.534     Hannan-Quinn criter. -5.244707 
F-statistic 6.846569     Durbin-Watson stat 1.176777 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000135    
     
      
High  
    
 
High leverage bank dependent 
Dependent Variable: INVESTMENTS  
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Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/09/14   Time: 21:05   
Sample: 2006Q3 2009Q1   
Periods included: 6   
Cross-sections included: 590   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 3540  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     DUMMY -0.001782 0.000944 -1.887661 0.0592 
DUMMY_PREVSLEHMA
N 0.002215 0.000690 3.209728 0.0013 
DGT 0.001648 0.001635 1.007370 0.3138 
C -0.014246 0.000398 -35.76197 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.005525     Mean dependent var -0.013727 
Adjusted R-squared 0.004681     S.D. dependent var 0.017586 
S.E. of regression 0.017545     Akaike info criterion -5.246942 
Sum squared resid 1.088502     Schwarz criterion -5.239969 
Log likelihood 9291.088     Hannan-Quinn criter. -5.244455 
F-statistic 6.548205     Durbin-Watson stat 1.176556 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000206    
     
      
Small bank dependent 
Dependent Variable: INVESTMENTS  
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/09/14   Time: 21:06   
Sample: 2006Q3 2009Q1   
Periods included: 6   
Cross-sections included: 590   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 3540  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     DUMMY 0.002622 0.001060 2.473558 0.0134 
DUMMY_PREVSLEHMA
N 0.002916 0.000672 4.339938 0.0000 
DGT -0.003050 0.001836 -1.660750 0.0969 
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C -0.014914 0.000388 -38.44446 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.006262     Mean dependent var -0.013727 
Adjusted R-squared 0.005419     S.D. dependent var 0.017586 
S.E. of regression 0.017539     Akaike info criterion -5.247684 
Sum squared resid 1.087695     Schwarz criterion -5.240710 
Log likelihood 9292.401     Hannan-Quinn criter. -5.245197 
F-statistic 7.427582     Durbin-Watson stat 1.176874 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000059    
     
      
Debt issuance 
High leverage 
Dependent Variable: DEBT_ISSUANCE  
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/09/14   Time: 21:13   
Sample: 2006Q3 2009Q1   
Periods included: 6   
Cross-sections included: 590   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 3537  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     DUMMY -0.002387 0.005426 -0.439886 0.6600 
DUMMY_PREVSLEHMA
N -0.009195 0.004096 -2.245044 0.0248 
DGT -0.015061 0.009398 -1.602571 0.1091 
C 0.010221 0.002366 4.320182 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.004524     Mean dependent var 0.005746 
Adjusted R-squared 0.003679     S.D. dependent var 0.103557 
S.E. of regression 0.103366     Akaike info criterion -1.699945 
Sum squared resid 37.74866     Schwarz criterion -1.692966 
Log likelihood 3010.353     Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.697456 
F-statistic 5.351970     Durbin-Watson stat 2.060101 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.001122    
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High leverage bank dependent 
Dependent Variable: DEBT_ISSUANCE  
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/09/14   Time: 21:14   
Sample: 2006Q3 2009Q1   
Periods included: 6   
Cross-sections included: 590   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 3537  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     DUMMY -0.002272 0.005563 -0.408384 0.6830 
DUMMY_PREVSLEHMA
N -0.008968 0.004065 -2.206031 0.0274 
DGT -0.017338 0.009634 -1.799536 0.0720 
C 0.010172 0.002348 4.331558 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.004810     Mean dependent var 0.005746 
Adjusted R-squared 0.003965     S.D. dependent var 0.103557 
S.E. of regression 0.103351     Akaike info criterion -1.700233 
Sum squared resid 37.73782     Schwarz criterion -1.693254 
Log likelihood 3010.861     Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.697743 
F-statistic 5.691989     Durbin-Watson stat 2.060309 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000694    
     
      
Small bank dependent 
Dependent Variable: DEBT_ISSUANCE  
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/09/14   Time: 21:18   
Sample: 2006Q3 2009Q1   
Periods included: 6   
Cross-sections included: 590   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 3537  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     DUMMY -0.007822 0.006251 -1.251373 0.2109 
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DUMMY_PREVSLEHMA
N -0.011796 0.003962 -2.976873 0.0029 
DGT -0.001932 0.010826 -0.178456 0.8584 
C 0.010816 0.002289 4.725388 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.003797     Mean dependent var 0.005746 
Adjusted R-squared 0.002952     S.D. dependent var 0.103557 
S.E. of regression 0.103404     Akaike info criterion -1.699216 
Sum squared resid 37.77621     Schwarz criterion -1.692237 
Log likelihood 3009.063     Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.696726 
F-statistic 4.489172     Durbin-Watson stat 2.056647 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.003769    
     
      
Low leverage 
Dependent Variable: DEBT_ISSUANCE  
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/09/14   Time: 21:28   
Sample: 2006Q3 2009Q1   
Periods included: 6   
Cross-sections included: 589   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 3531  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     DUMMY 0.001398 0.004143 0.337413 0.7358 
DUMMY_PREVSLEHMA
N -0.013006 0.003808 -3.415329 0.0006 
DGT 0.007201 0.007173 1.003884 0.3155 
C 0.009606 0.002199 4.367748 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.003660     Mean dependent var 0.005757 
Adjusted R-squared 0.002813     S.D. dependent var 0.103645 
S.E. of regression 0.103499     Akaike info criterion -1.697385 
Sum squared resid 37.78111     Schwarz criterion -1.690396 
Log likelihood 3000.732     Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.694891 
F-statistic 4.319188     Durbin-Watson stat 2.058833 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.004778    
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High Cash 
Dependent Variable: DEBT_ISSUANCE  
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/09/14   Time: 21:31   
Sample: 2006Q3 2009Q1   
Periods included: 6   
Cross-sections included: 590   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 3537  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     DUMMYCOMPANY -0.009474 0.007863 -1.204841 0.2283 
DUMMY_PREVSLEHMA
N -0.013069 0.003845 -3.399322 0.0007 
DGT 0.012739 0.013619 0.935420 0.3496 
C 0.010523 0.002221 4.738464 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.003446     Mean dependent var 0.005746 
Adjusted R-squared 0.002600     S.D. dependent var 0.103557 
S.E. of regression 0.103422     Akaike info criterion -1.698863 
Sum squared resid 37.78953     Schwarz criterion -1.691884 
Log likelihood 3008.440     Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.696374 
F-statistic 4.072656     Durbin-Watson stat 2.057693 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.006733    
     
      
Cash holdings 
High leverage 
Dependent Variable: CASHHOLDINGS  
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/09/14   Time: 21:43   
Sample: 2006Q3 2009Q1   
Periods included: 6   
Cross-sections included: 590   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 3540  
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Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     DUMMY -0.093839 0.011650 -8.055173 0.0000 
DUMMY_PREVSLEHMA
N -0.019976 0.008791 -2.272267 0.0231 
DGT 0.004524 0.020178 0.224206 0.8226 
C 0.173988 0.005076 34.27895 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.027533     Mean dependent var 0.149802 
Adjusted R-squared 0.026708     S.D. dependent var 0.224964 
S.E. of regression 0.221940     Akaike info criterion -0.171694 
Sum squared resid 174.1733     Schwarz criterion -0.164720 
Log likelihood 307.8985     Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.169207 
F-statistic 33.37094     Durbin-Watson stat 0.422234 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      
 
    
 
 
 
    
	  
High leverage bank dependent 
 
Dependent Variable: CASHHOLDINGS  
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/09/14   Time: 21:45   
Sample: 2006Q3 2009Q1   
Periods included: 6   
Cross-sections included: 590   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 3540  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     DUMMY -0.100428 0.011929 -8.418906 0.0000 
DUMMY_PREVSLEHMA
N -0.019781 0.008716 -2.269485 0.0233 
DGT 0.003731 0.020661 0.180599 0.8567 
C 0.174047 0.005032 34.58577 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.030059     Mean dependent var 0.149802 
Adjusted R-squared 0.029237     S.D. dependent var 0.224964 
S.E. of regression 0.221651     Akaike info criterion -0.174296 
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Sum squared resid 173.7208     Schwarz criterion -0.167322 
Log likelihood 312.5032     Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.171808 
F-statistic 36.52814     Durbin-Watson stat 0.421480 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
8.2.3 Pre-crisis versus last year 
Investments 
High leverage 
Dependent Variable: INVESTMENT  
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/09/14   Time: 22:56   
Sample: 2006Q3 2010Q1   
Periods included: 8   
Cross-sections included: 590   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 4718  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     DUMMY -0.001931 0.000906 -2.132358 0.0330 
DUMMYPREVSLAST 0.004406 0.000558 7.894730 0.0000 
DGT 0.002775 0.001281 2.166512 0.0303 
C -0.014196 0.000395 -35.98039 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.021149     Mean dependent var -0.012097 
Adjusted R-squared 0.020526     S.D. dependent var 0.017432 
S.E. of regression 0.017252     Akaike info criterion -5.280882 
Sum squared resid 1.403102     Schwarz criterion -5.275406 
Log likelihood 12461.60     Hannan-Quinn criter. -5.278957 
F-statistic 33.95074     Durbin-Watson stat 1.363302 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      
 
High leverage bank dependent 
Dependent Variable: INVESTMENT  
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Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/09/14   Time: 22:59   
Sample: 2006Q3 2010Q1   
Periods included: 8   
Cross-sections included: 589   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 4710  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     DUMMY -0.001754 0.000929 -1.887745 0.0591 
DUMMYPREVSLAST 0.004453 0.000555 8.024020 0.0000 
DGT 0.002743 0.001314 2.087534 0.0369 
C -0.014274 0.000392 -36.38449 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.021056     Mean dependent var -0.012117 
Adjusted R-squared 0.020432     S.D. dependent var 0.017441 
S.E. of regression 0.017262     Akaike info criterion -5.279817 
Sum squared resid 1.402211     Schwarz criterion -5.274333 
Log likelihood 12437.97     Hannan-Quinn criter. -5.277889 
F-statistic 33.73959     Durbin-Watson stat 1.363593 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
	  
Small bank dependent 
Dependent Variable: INVESTMENT  
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/09/14   Time: 23:00   
Sample: 2006Q3 2010Q1   
Periods included: 8   
Cross-sections included: 590   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 4718  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     DUMMY 0.002622 0.001042 2.516277 0.0119 
DUMMYPREVSLAST 0.004961 0.000539 9.195728 0.0000 
DGT -0.000207 0.001474 -0.140146 0.8886 
C -0.014914 0.000381 -39.10844 0.0000 
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R-squared 0.022452     Mean dependent var -0.012097 
Adjusted R-squared 0.021830     S.D. dependent var 0.017432 
S.E. of regression 0.017241     Akaike info criterion -5.282214 
Sum squared resid 1.401235     Schwarz criterion -5.276737 
Log likelihood 12464.74     Hannan-Quinn criter. -5.280289 
F-statistic 36.09010     Durbin-Watson stat 1.365838 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
	  
Low leverage 
 
Dependent Variable: INVESTMENT  
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/09/14   Time: 23:01   
Sample: 2006Q3 2010Q1   
Periods included: 8   
Cross-sections included: 589   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 4710  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     DUMMY 0.001731 0.001128 1.534285 0.1250 
DUMMYPREVSLAST 0.005246 0.000534 9.821805 0.0000 
DGT -0.002732 0.001595 -1.712330 0.0869 
C -0.014766 0.000378 -39.10799 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.020701     Mean dependent var -0.012104 
Adjusted R-squared 0.020076     S.D. dependent var 0.017446 
S.E. of regression 0.017270     Akaike info criterion -5.278849 
Sum squared resid 1.403569     Schwarz criterion -5.273365 
Log likelihood 12435.69     Hannan-Quinn criter. -5.276921 
F-statistic 33.15884     Durbin-Watson stat 1.359804 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
	  
High cash  
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Dependent Variable: INVESTMENT 
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/09/14   Time: 23:03   
Sample: 2006Q3 2010Q1   
Periods included: 8   
Cross-sections included: 590   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 4720  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     DUMMYCOMPANY 0.003167 0.001311 2.415000 0.0158 
DUMMYPREVSLAST 0.005266 0.000523 10.06107 0.0000 
DGT -0.004102 0.001854 -2.212008 0.0270 
C -0.014815 0.000370 -40.03144 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.021394     Mean dependent var -0.012093 
Adjusted R-squared 0.020772     S.D. dependent var 0.017430 
S.E. of regression 0.017248     Akaike info criterion -5.281431 
Sum squared resid 1.402927     Schwarz criterion -5.275957 
Log likelihood 12468.18     Hannan-Quinn criter. -5.279507 
F-statistic 34.36703     Durbin-Watson stat 1.364380 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      
Debt issuance 
High leverage 
Dependent Variable: DEBT_ISSUANCE  
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/09/14   Time: 23:04   
Sample: 2006Q3 2010Q1   
Periods included: 8   
Cross-sections included: 590   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 4716  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     DUMMY -0.002387 0.004291 -0.556317 0.5780 
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DUMMYPREVSLAST -0.014726 0.002645 -5.567733 0.0000 
DGT -0.005069 0.006068 -0.835454 0.4035 
C 0.010221 0.001871 5.463666 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.009827     Mean dependent var 0.001920 
Adjusted R-squared 0.009197     S.D. dependent var 0.082111 
S.E. of regression 0.081733     Akaike info criterion -2.169873 
Sum squared resid 31.47741     Schwarz criterion -2.164395 
Log likelihood 5120.560     Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.167947 
F-statistic 15.58874     Durbin-Watson stat 2.084383 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      
High leverage bank dependent 
Dependent Variable: DEBT_ISSUANCE  
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/09/14   Time: 23:05   
Sample: 2006Q3 2010Q1   
Periods included: 8   
Cross-sections included: 590   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 4717  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     DUMMY -0.002765 0.004383 -0.630966 0.5281 
DUMMYPREVSLAST -0.014949 0.002628 -5.688631 0.0000 
DGT -0.004160 0.006198 -0.671240 0.5021 
C 0.010264 0.001859 5.521746 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.009747     Mean dependent var 0.001914 
Adjusted R-squared 0.009117     S.D. dependent var 0.082104 
S.E. of regression 0.081728     Akaike info criterion -2.169982 
Sum squared resid 31.48065     Schwarz criterion -2.164505 
Log likelihood 5121.903     Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.168057 
F-statistic 15.46312     Durbin-Watson stat 2.083663 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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8.3 Matching estimator 
8.3.1 Pre-crisis versus first year 
Investments 
High leverage 
 
High leverage bank dependent 
 
 
 
 
 
. 
Bias-adj variables:  M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
Matching variables:  M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
                                                                              
        SATT     .0000494   .0014345     0.03   0.973    -.0027621    .0028609
                                                                              
hlprevsfirst        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                              robust std. err. (h) =         1
                                            Number of matches, 
                                            Number of matches  (m) =         1
Weighting matrix: inverse variance          Number of obs          =       591
Matching estimator:  Average Treatment Effect for the Treated
. nnmatch hlprevsfirst Dummy M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6, tc(att) bias(bias) robust(1)
Bias-adj variables:  M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
Matching variables:  M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
                                                                              
        SATT     .0005988   .0015028     0.40   0.690    -.0023466    .0035443
                                                                              
hlbdprevsf~t        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                              robust std. err. (h) =         1
                                            Number of matches, 
                                            Number of matches  (m) =         1
Weighting matrix: inverse variance          Number of obs          =       591
Matching estimator:  Average Treatment Effect for the Treated
. nnmatch hlbdprevsfirst Dummy M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6, tc(att) bias(bias) robust(1)
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Small bank dependent 
 
 
Low leverage 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bias-adj variables:  M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
Matching variables:  M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
                                                                              
        SATT     -.002286   .0024162    -0.95   0.344    -.0070216    .0024497
                                                                              
sbdprevsfi~t        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                              robust std. err. (h) =         1
                                            Number of matches, 
                                            Number of matches  (m) =         1
Weighting matrix: inverse variance          Number of obs          =       591
Matching estimator:  Average Treatment Effect for the Treated
. nnmatch sbdprevsfirst Dummy M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6, tc(att) bias(bias) robust(1)
Bias-adj variables:  M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
Matching variables:  M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
                                                                              
        SATT     .0006426   .0021594     0.30   0.766    -.0035898     .004875
                                                                              
nlprevsfirst        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                              robust std. err. (h) =         1
                                            Number of matches, 
                                            Number of matches  (m) =         1
Weighting matrix: inverse variance          Number of obs          =       591
Matching estimator:  Average Treatment Effect for the Treated
. nnmatch nlprevsfirst Dummy M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6, tc(att) bias(bias) robust(1)
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High cash 
 
 
Debt Issuance 
High leverage 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bias-adj variables:  M1 M2 M4 M5 M6
Matching variables:  M1 M2 M4 M5 M6
                                                                              
        SATT      .000075   .0026993     0.03   0.978    -.0052156    .0053656
                                                                              
hcprevsfirst        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                              robust std. err. (h) =         1
                                            Number of matches, 
                                            Number of matches  (m) =         1
Weighting matrix: inverse variance          Number of obs          =       591
Matching estimator:  Average Treatment Effect for the Treated
. nnmatch hcprevsfirst Dummy M1 M2 M4 M5 M6, tc(att) bias(bias) robust(1)
Bias-adj variables:  M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
Matching variables:  M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
                                                                              
        SATT    -.0002471   .0079228    -0.03   0.975    -.0157755    .0152814
                                                                              
hlprevsfirst        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                              robust std. err. (h) =         1
                                            Number of matches, 
                                            Number of matches  (m) =         1
Weighting matrix: inverse variance          Number of obs          =       591
Matching estimator:  Average Treatment Effect for the Treated
. nnmatch hlprevsfirst Dummy M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6, tc(att) bias(bias) robust(1)
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High leverage bank dependent 
 
Small bank dependent 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
. 
Bias-adj variables:  M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
Matching variables:  M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
                                                                              
        SATT     .0257304   .0142651     1.80   0.071    -.0022286    .0536895
                                                                              
hlbdprevsf~t        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                              robust std. err. (h) =         1
                                            Number of matches, 
                                            Number of matches  (m) =         1
Weighting matrix: inverse variance          Number of obs          =       591
Matching estimator:  Average Treatment Effect for the Treated
. nnmatch hlbdprevsfirst Dummy M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6, tc(att) bias(bias) robust(1)
Bias-adj variables:  M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
Matching variables:  M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
                                                                              
        SATT      .010024    .013905     0.72   0.471    -.0172293    .0372772
                                                                              
sbdprevsfi~t        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                              robust std. err. (h) =         1
                                            Number of matches, 
                                            Number of matches  (m) =         1
Weighting matrix: inverse variance          Number of obs          =       591
Matching estimator:  Average Treatment Effect for the Treated
.  nnmatch sbdprevsfirst Dummy M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6, tc(att) bias(bias) robust(1)
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Low leverage 
 
 
8.3.2 Pre-crisis versus post-Lehman 
Investments 
High leverage 
 
 
 
 
 
. 
Bias-adj variables:  M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
Matching variables:  M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
                                                                              
        SATT     .0026513   .0076952     0.34   0.730    -.0124311    .0177336
                                                                              
nlprevsfirst        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                              robust std. err. (h) =         1
                                            Number of matches, 
                                            Number of matches  (m) =         1
Weighting matrix: inverse variance          Number of obs          =       591
Matching estimator:  Average Treatment Effect for the Treated
. nnmatch nlprevsfirst Dummy M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6, tc(att) robust(1) bias(bias)
Bias-adj variables:  M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
Matching variables:  M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
                                                                              
        SATT     .0009014   .0018379     0.49   0.624    -.0027007    .0045036
                                                                              
hlprevsleh~n        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                              robust std. err. (h) =         1
                                            Number of matches, 
                                            Number of matches  (m) =         1
Weighting matrix: inverse variance          Number of obs          =       591
Matching estimator:  Average Treatment Effect for the Treated
. nnmatch hlprevslehman Dummy M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6, tc(att) bias(bias) robust(1)
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High leverage bank dependent 
 
 
Small bank dependent 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bias-adj variables:  M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
Matching variables:  M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
                                                                              
        SATT      .001545   .0019034     0.81   0.417    -.0021857    .0052756
                                                                              
hlbdprevsl~n        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                              robust std. err. (h) =         1
                                            Number of matches, 
                                            Number of matches  (m) =         1
Weighting matrix: inverse variance          Number of obs          =       591
Matching estimator:  Average Treatment Effect for the Treated
. nnmatch hlbdprevslehman Dummy M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6, tc(att) bias(bias) robust(1)
Bias-adj variables:  M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
Matching variables:  M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
                                                                              
        SATT    -.0020585    .002796    -0.74   0.462    -.0075386    .0034216
                                                                              
sbdprevsle~n        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                              robust std. err. (h) =         1
                                            Number of matches, 
                                            Number of matches  (m) =         1
Weighting matrix: inverse variance          Number of obs          =       591
Matching estimator:  Average Treatment Effect for the Treated
. nnmatch sbdprevslehman Dummy M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6, tc(att) bias(bias) robust(1)
 83 
 
Low leverage 
 
 
High Cash 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bias-adj variables:  M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
Matching variables:  M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
                                                                              
        SATT    -.0017982   .0025012    -0.72   0.472    -.0067005    .0031041
                                                                              
nlprevsleh~n        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                              robust std. err. (h) =         1
                                            Number of matches, 
                                            Number of matches  (m) =         1
Weighting matrix: inverse variance          Number of obs          =       591
Matching estimator:  Average Treatment Effect for the Treated
. nnmatch nlprevslehman Dummy M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6, tc(att) bias(bias) robust(1)
Bias-adj variables:  M1 M2 M4 M5 M6
Matching variables:  M1 M2 M4 M5 M6
                                                                              
        SATT      .000826   .0032259     0.26   0.798    -.0054967    .0071487
                                                                              
hcprevspos~n        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                              robust std. err. (h) =         1
                                            Number of matches, 
                                            Number of matches  (m) =         1
Weighting matrix: inverse variance          Number of obs          =       591
Matching estimator:  Average Treatment Effect for the Treated
. nnmatch hcprevspostlehman Dummy M1 M2 M4 M5 M6, tc(att) bias(bias) robust(1)
 84 
 
Debt issuance 
High leverage 
 
 
High leverage bank dependent 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bias-adj variables:  M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
Matching variables:  M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
                                                                              
        SATT    -.0113343   .0126333    -0.90   0.370    -.0360951    .0134266
                                                                              
hlprevsleh~n        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                              robust std. err. (h) =         1
                                            Number of matches, 
                                            Number of matches  (m) =         1
Weighting matrix: inverse variance          Number of obs          =       591
Matching estimator:  Average Treatment Effect for the Treated
. nnmatch hlprevslehman Dummy M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6, tc(att) bias(bias) robust(1)
. 
Bias-adj variables:  M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
Matching variables:  M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
                                                                              
        SATT     .0514433   .0250906     2.05   0.040     .0022666      .10062
                                                                              
hlbdprevsl~n        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                              robust std. err. (h) =         1
                                            Number of matches, 
                                            Number of matches  (m) =         1
Weighting matrix: inverse variance          Number of obs          =       591
Matching estimator:  Average Treatment Effect for the Treated
. nnmatch hlbdprevslehman Dummy M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6, tc(att) bias(bias) robust(1)
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Small bank dependent 
 
 
8.3.3 Pre-crisis versus last year 
Investments 
High leverage 
 
High leverage 
Bias-adj variables:  M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
Matching variables:  M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
                                                                              
        SATT     .0139812   .0198279     0.71   0.481    -.0248807     .052843
                                                                              
sbdprevsle~n        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                              robust std. err. (h) =         1
                                            Number of matches, 
                                            Number of matches  (m) =         1
Weighting matrix: inverse variance          Number of obs          =       591
Matching estimator:  Average Treatment Effect for the Treated
. nnmatch sbdprevslehman Dummy M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6, tc(att) bias(bias) robust(1)
Bias-adj variables:  M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
Matching variables:  M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
                                                                              
        SATT     .0625217   .0262976     2.38   0.017     .0109795     .114064
                                                                              
 hlprevslast        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                              robust std. err. (h) =         1
                                            Number of matches, 
                                            Number of matches  (m) =         1
Weighting matrix: inverse variance          Number of obs          =       591
Matching estimator:  Average Treatment Effect for the Treated
. nnmatch hlprevslast Dummy M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6, tc(att) bias(bias) robust(1)
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Small bank dependent 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bias-adj variables:  M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
Matching variables:  M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
                                                                              
        SATT     .0023053    .001699     1.36   0.175    -.0010248    .0056353
                                                                              
hlbdprevsl~t        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                              robust std. err. (h) =         1
                                            Number of matches, 
                                            Number of matches  (m) =         1
Weighting matrix: inverse variance          Number of obs          =       591
Matching estimator:  Average Treatment Effect for the Treated
.  nnmatch hlbdprevslast Dummy M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6, tc(att) bias(bias) robust(1)
. 
Bias-adj variables:  M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
Matching variables:  M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
                                                                              
        SATT     .0033594   .0033019     1.02   0.309    -.0031122    .0098309
                                                                              
sbdprevslast        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                              robust std. err. (h) =         1
                                            Number of matches, 
                                            Number of matches  (m) =         1
Weighting matrix: inverse variance          Number of obs          =       591
Matching estimator:  Average Treatment Effect for the Treated
. nnmatch sbdprevslast Dummy M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6, tc(att) bias(bias) robust(1)
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Low leverage 
 
 
High cash 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bias-adj variables:  M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
Matching variables:  M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
                                                                              
        SATT    -.0023568   .0026455    -0.89   0.373    -.0075419    .0028283
                                                                              
 nlprevslast        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                              robust std. err. (h) =         1
                                            Number of matches, 
                                            Number of matches  (m) =         1
Weighting matrix: inverse variance          Number of obs          =       591
Matching estimator:  Average Treatment Effect for the Treated
. nnmatch nlprevslast Dummy M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6, tc(att) bias(bias) robust(1)
. *(1 variable, 591 observations pasted into data editor)
Bias-adj variables:  M1 M2 M4 M5 M6
Matching variables:  M1 M2 M4 M5 M6
                                                                              
        SATT    -.0025527    .003071    -0.83   0.406    -.0085717    .0034664
                                                                              
 hcprevslast        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                              robust std. err. (h) =         1
                                            Number of matches, 
                                            Number of matches  (m) =         1
Weighting matrix: inverse variance          Number of obs          =       591
Matching estimator:  Average Treatment Effect for the Treated
. nnmatch hcprevslast Dummy M1 M2 M4 M5 M6, tc(att) bias(bias) robust(1)
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Cash holdings 
High leverage 
 
	  
High leverage bank dependent 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bias-adj variables:  M1 M2 M4 M5 M6
Matching variables:  M1 M2 M4 M5 M6
                                                                              
        SATT     .0719514   .0535449     1.34   0.179    -.0329948    .1768976
                                                                              
 hlprevslast        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                              robust std. err. (h) =         1
                                            Number of matches, 
                                            Number of matches  (m) =         1
Weighting matrix: inverse variance          Number of obs          =       591
Matching estimator:  Average Treatment Effect for the Treated
. nnmatch hlprevslast Dummy M1 M2 M4 M5 M6, tc(att) bias(bias) robust(1)
Bias-adj variables:  M1 M2 M4 M5 M6
Matching variables:  M1 M2 M4 M5 M6
                                                                              
        SATT     .0736748   .0520137     1.42   0.157    -.0282701    .1756198
                                                                              
hlbdprevsl~t        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                              robust std. err. (h) =         1
                                            Number of matches, 
                                            Number of matches  (m) =         1
Weighting matrix: inverse variance          Number of obs          =       591
Matching estimator:  Average Treatment Effect for the Treated
. nnmatch hlbdprevslast Dummy M1 M2 M4 M5 M6, tc(att) bias(bias) robust(1)
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Small bank dependent 
 
 
Low leverage 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bias-adj variables:  rating sales icb mb Operatingcf
Matching variables:  rating sales icb mb Operatingcf
                                                                              
        SATT    -.0302454   .0398436    -0.76   0.448    -.1083373    .0478466
                                                                              
sbdprevslast        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                              robust std. err. (h) =         1
                                            Number of matches, 
                                            Number of matches  (m) =         1
Weighting matrix: inverse variance          Number of obs          =       591
Matching estimator:  Average Treatment Effect for the Treated
. nnmatch sbdprevslast Dummy rating sales icb mb Operatingcf, tc(att) bias(bias) robust(1)
Bias-adj variables:  M1 M2 M4 M5 M6
Matching variables:  M1 M2 M4 M5 M6
                                                                              
        SATT     .0608474   .0285701     2.13   0.033      .004851    .1168438
                                                                              
 nlprevslast        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                              robust std. err. (h) =         1
                                            Number of matches, 
                                            Number of matches  (m) =         1
Weighting matrix: inverse variance          Number of obs          =       591
Matching estimator:  Average Treatment Effect for the Treated
. nnmatch nlprevslast Dummy M1 M2 M4 M5 M6, tc(att) bias(bias) robust(1)
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8.4 T-test 
8.4.1 Pre-crisis versus first year 
Investments 
Whole sample 
T-­‐test	  whole	  sample	  
	   	  t-­‐Test:	  Two-­‐Sample	  Assuming	  Unequal	  Variances	  
	   	  
	   	   	  	  	   Variable	  1	   Variable	  2	  
Mean	   -­‐0,014562757	   -­‐0,014497605	  
Variance	   0,000355422	   0,000409007	  
Observations	   2360	   2360	  
Hypothesized	  Mean	  Difference	   0	  
	  df	   4695	  
	  t	  Stat	   -­‐0,11447595	  
	  P(T<=t)	  one-­‐tail	   0,454432702	  
	  t	  Critical	  one-­‐tail	   1,645178243	  
	  P(T<=t)	  two-­‐tail	   0,908865405	  
	  t	  Critical	  two-­‐tail	   1,960469389	   	  
	  
High leverage 
t-­‐Test:	  Two-­‐Sample	  Assuming	  Unequal	  Variances	  
	   	  
	   	   	  	  	   Variable	  1	   Variable	  2	  
Mean	   -­‐0,016127194	   -­‐0,01587089	  
Variance	   0,000350718	   0,000346542	  
Observations	   448	   448	  
Hypothesized	  Mean	  Difference	   0	  
	  df	   894	  
	  t	  Stat	   -­‐0,205445812	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P(T<=t)	  one-­‐tail	   0,4186353	  
	  t	  Critical	  one-­‐tail	   1,646559845	  
	  P(T<=t)	  two-­‐tail	   0,837270601	  
	  t	  Critical	  two-­‐tail	   1,962621067	   	  
	  
High leverage bank dependent 
T-­‐test	  
	   	  t-­‐Test:	  Two-­‐Sample	  Assuming	  Unequal	  Variances	  
	   	  
	   	   	  	  	   Variable	  1	   Variable	  2	  
Mean	   -­‐0,015881413	   -­‐0,015732787	  
Variance	   0,000338834	   0,000345576	  
Observations	   424	   424	  
Hypothesized	  Mean	  Difference	   0	  
	  df	   846	  
	  t	  Stat	   -­‐0,11698242	  
	  P(T<=t)	  one-­‐tail	   0,453450875	  
	  t	  Critical	  one-­‐tail	   1,646656758	  
	  P(T<=t)	  two-­‐tail	   0,906901749	  
	  t	  Critical	  two-­‐tail	   1,962772035	   	  
	  
Small bank dependent 
t-­‐Test:	  Two-­‐Sample	  Assuming	  Unequal	  Variances	  
	   	  
	   	   	  	  	   Variable	  1	   Variable	  2	  
Mean	   -­‐0,01229153	   -­‐0,013712493	  
Variance	   0,000325746	   0,0005727	  
Observations	   316	   316	  
Hypothesized	  Mean	  Difference	   0	  
	  df	   586	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t	  Stat	   0,842714397	  
	  P(T<=t)	  one-­‐tail	   0,199866005	  
	  t	  Critical	  one-­‐tail	   1,647458056	  
	  P(T<=t)	  two-­‐tail	   0,399732011	  
	  t	  Critical	  two-­‐tail	   1,964020461	   	  
	  
Low leverage 
T-­‐test	  
	   	  t-­‐Test:	  Two-­‐Sample	  Assuming	  Unequal	  Variances	  
	   	  
	   	   	  	  	   Variable	  1	   Variable	  2	  
Mean	   -­‐0,012944073	   -­‐0,010516305	  
Variance	   0,000740191	   0,000231486	  
Observations	   268	   268	  
Hypothesized	  Mean	  Difference	   0	  
	  df	   419	  
	  t	  Stat	   -­‐1,275009925	  
	  P(T<=t)	  one-­‐tail	   0,101506134	  
	  t	  Critical	  one-­‐tail	   1,64849841	  
	  P(T<=t)	  two-­‐tail	   0,203012267	  
	  t	  Critical	  two-­‐tail	   1,965641842	   	  
	  
High cash 
T-­‐test	  High	  cash	  
	   	  t-­‐Test:	  Two-­‐Sample	  Assuming	  Unequal	  Variances	  
	   	  
	   	   	  	  	   Variable	  1	   Variable	  2	  
Mean	   -­‐0,011648397	   -­‐0,010714093	  
Variance	   0,000719942	   0,000159159	  
Observations	   188	   188	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Hypothesized	  Mean	  Difference	   0	  
	  df	   266	  
	  t	  Stat	   -­‐0,432063653	  
	  P(T<=t)	  one-­‐tail	   0,33302259	  
	  t	  Critical	  one-­‐tail	   1,650602207	  
	  P(T<=t)	  two-­‐tail	   0,666045179	  
	  t	  Critical	  two-­‐tail	   1,968922324	   	  
	  
Equity issuance 
Whole sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	   	  
t-­‐Test:	  Two-­‐Sample	  Assuming	  Unequal	  Variances
Variable	  1 Variable	  2
Mean 0,005518443 -­‐0,000717165
Variance 0,004783883 0,005059906
Observations 1793 1832
Hypothesized	  Mean	  Difference 0
df 3623
t	  Stat 2,675943802
P(T<=t)	  one-­‐tail 0,003742725
t	  Critical	  one-­‐tail 1,645274317
P(T<=t)	  two-­‐tail 0,007485451
t	  Critical	  two-­‐tail 1,960618981
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High leverage 
 
 
High leverage bank dependent 
 
 
Small bank dependent 
t-­‐Test:	  Two-­‐Sample	  Assuming	  Unequal	  Variances
Variable	  1 Variable	  2
Mean 0,004711512 0,006601863
Variance 0,00610567 0,006128963
Observations 331 339
Hypothesized	  Mean	  Difference 0
df 668
t	  Stat -­‐0,31278317
P(T<=t)	  one-­‐tail 0,377271514
t	  Critical	  one-­‐tail 1,647137905
P(T<=t)	  two-­‐tail 0,754543027
t	  Critical	  two-­‐tail 1,963521623
t-­‐Test:	  Two-­‐Sample	  Assuming	  Unequal	  Variances
Variable	  1 Variable	  2
Mean 0,003181199 0,007661495
Variance 0,006006793 0,006381187
Observations 309 314
Hypothesized	  Mean	  Difference 0
df 621
t	  Stat -­‐0,71051655
P(T<=t)	  one-­‐tail 0,238825309
t	  Critical	  one-­‐tail 1,647311048
P(T<=t)	  two-­‐tail 0,477650618
t	  Critical	  two-­‐tail 1,963791397
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Low leverage 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
t-­‐Test:	  Two-­‐Sample	  Assuming	  Unequal	  Variances
Variable	  1 Variable	  2
Mean 0,011644951 0,003857755
Variance 0,003383591 0,002642005
Observations 272 273
Hypothesized	  Mean	  Difference 0
df 534
t	  Stat 1,655825511
P(T<=t)	  one-­‐tail 0,049172321
t	  Critical	  one-­‐tail 1,647712114
P(T<=t)	  two-­‐tail 0,098344643
t	  Critical	  two-­‐tail 1,964416355
t-­‐Test:	  Two-­‐Sample	  Assuming	  Unequal	  Variances
Variable	  1 Variable	  2
Mean 0,005757321 0,002012948
Variance 0,003972285 0,003520025
Observations 217 220
Hypothesized	  Mean	  Difference 0
df 433
t	  Stat 0,639288338
P(T<=t)	  one-­‐tail 0,261486711
t	  Critical	  one-­‐tail 1,648380311
P(T<=t)	  two-­‐tail 0,522973423
t	  Critical	  two-­‐tail 1,965457757
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High cash 
 
	  
8.4.2 Pre-crisis versus post-Lehman 
Investments 
Whole sample 
t-­‐test	  
	   	  t-­‐Test:	  Two-­‐Sample	  Assuming	  Unequal	  Variances	  
	   	  
	   	   	  	  	   Variable	  1	   Variable	  2	  
Mean	   -­‐0,014562757	   -­‐0,012054993	  
Variance	   0,000355422	   0,00021303	  
Observations	   2360	   1180	  
Hypothesized	  Mean	  Difference	   0	  
	  df	   2943	  
	  t	  Stat	   -­‐4,357959543	  
	  P(T<=t)	  one-­‐tail	   6,78877E-­‐06	  
	  t	  Critical	  one-­‐tail	   1,645371551	  
	  P(T<=t)	  two-­‐tail	   1,35775E-­‐05	  
	  t	  Critical	  two-­‐tail	   1,960770383	   	  
t-­‐Test:	  Two-­‐Sample	  Assuming	  Unequal	  Variances
Variable	  1 Variable	  2
Mean 0,008937297 0,005653369
Variance 0,004830987 0,003744762
Observations 162 163
Hypothesized	  Mean	  Difference 0
df 317
t	  Stat 0,451957497
P(T<=t)	  one-­‐tail 0,325804345
t	  Critical	  one-­‐tail 1,649674634
P(T<=t)	  two-­‐tail 0,65160869
t	  Critical	  two-­‐tail 1,967475658
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High leverage 
t-­‐test	  
	   	  t-­‐Test:	  Two-­‐Sample	  Assuming	  Unequal	  Variances	  
	   	  
	   	   	  	  	   Variable	  1	   Variable	  2	  
Mean	   -­‐0,016127194	   -­‐0,012328009	  
Variance	   0,000350718	   0,000199094	  
Observations	   448	   224	  
Hypothesized	  Mean	  Difference	   0	  
	  df	   569	  
	  t	  Stat	   -­‐2,938432833	  
	  P(T<=t)	  one-­‐tail	   0,001716248	  
	  t	  Critical	  one-­‐tail	   1,647535996	  
	  P(T<=t)	  two-­‐tail	   0,003432496	  
	  t	  Critical	  two-­‐tail	   1,96414191	   	  
 
High leverage bank dependent 
t-­‐test	  
	   	  t-­‐Test:	  Two-­‐Sample	  Assuming	  Unequal	  Variances	  
	   	  
	   	   	  	  	   Variable	  1	   Variable	  2	  
Mean	   -­‐0,016027977	   -­‐0,012165871	  
Variance	   0,000339785	   0,000200427	  
Observations	   420	   210	  
Hypothesized	  Mean	  Difference	   0	  
	  df	   525	  
	  t	  Stat	   -­‐2,908341677	  
	  P(T<=t)	  one-­‐tail	   0,001893672	  
	  t	  Critical	  one-­‐tail	   1,647761204	  
	  P(T<=t)	  two-­‐tail	   0,003787345	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t	  Critical	  two-­‐tail	   1,964492854	   	  	  
 
Small bank dependent 
t-­‐test	  
	   	  t-­‐Test:	  Two-­‐Sample	  Assuming	  Unequal	  Variances	  
	   	  
	   	   	  	  	   Variable	  1	   Variable	  2	  
Mean	   -­‐0,01229153	   -­‐0,012424978	  
Variance	   0,000325746	   0,000393748	  
Observations	   316	   158	  
Hypothesized	  Mean	  Difference	   0	  
	  df	   289	  
	  t	  Stat	   0,071098552	  
	  P(T<=t)	  one-­‐tail	   0,471684248	  
	  t	  Critical	  one-­‐tail	   1,650143229	  
	  P(T<=t)	  two-­‐tail	   0,943368495	  
	  t	  Critical	  two-­‐tail	   1,968206436	   	  
	  
Low leverage 
t-­‐test	  
	   	  t-­‐Test:	  Two-­‐Sample	  Assuming	  Unequal	  Variances	  
	   	  
	   	   	  	  	   Variable	  1	   Variable	  2	  
Mean	   -­‐0,013035813	   -­‐0,0104371	  
Variance	   0,000750872	   0,000232918	  
Observations	   264	   132	  
Hypothesized	  Mean	  Difference	   0	  
	  df	   390	  
	  t	  Stat	   -­‐1,210506383	  
	  P(T<=t)	  one-­‐tail	   0,113408873	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t	  Critical	  one-­‐tail	   1,648770081	  
	  P(T<=t)	  two-­‐tail	   0,226817747	  
	  t	  Critical	  two-­‐tail	   1,966065331	   	  
 
High cash 
t-­‐Test:	  Two-­‐Sample	  Assuming	  Unequal	  Variances	  
	   	  
	   	   	  	  	   Variable	  1	   Variable	  2	  
Mean	   -­‐0,011648397	   -­‐0,00982868	  
Variance	   0,000719942	   0,000193843	  
Observations	   188	   94	  
Hypothesized	  Mean	  Difference	   0	  
	  df	   280	  
	  t	  Stat	   -­‐0,749697221	  
	  P(T<=t)	  one-­‐tail	   0,227033254	  
	  t	  Critical	  one-­‐tail	   1,650313819	  
	  P(T<=t)	  two-­‐tail	   0,454066507	  
	  t	  Critical	  two-­‐tail	   1,9684725	   	  
 
8.4.3 Pre-crisis versus last period 
Investments 
Whole sample 
t-­‐Test:	  Two-­‐Sample	  Assuming	  Unequal	  Variances	  
	   	  
	   	   	  	  	   Variable	  1	   Variable	  2	  
Mean	   -­‐0,014562754	   -­‐0,009623767	  
Variance	   0,000355422	   0,00024009	  
Observations	   2360	   2360	  
Hypothesized	  Mean	  Difference	   0	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df	   4547	  
	  t	  Stat	   -­‐9,832151056	  
	  P(T<=t)	  one-­‐tail	   6,86401E-­‐23	  
	  t	  Critical	  one-­‐tail	   1,645188811	  
	  P(T<=t)	  two-­‐tail	   1,3728E-­‐22	  
	  t	  Critical	  two-­‐tail	   1,960485843	   	  
	   	   	  
	  
High leverage 
	   	  t-­‐Test:	  Two-­‐Sample	  Assuming	  Unequal	  Variances	  
	   	  
	   	   	  	  	   Variable	  1	   Variable	  2	  
Mean	   -­‐0,016127194	   -­‐0,009129686	  
Variance	   0,000350718	   0,000130356	  
Observations	   448	   424	  
Hypothesized	  Mean	  Difference	   0	  
	  df	   746	  
	  t	  Stat	   -­‐6,701484932	  
	  P(T<=t)	  one-­‐tail	   2,03392E-­‐11	  
	  t	  Critical	  one-­‐tail	   1,646898767	  
	  P(T<=t)	  two-­‐tail	   4,06784E-­‐11	  
	  t	  Critical	  two-­‐tail	   1,963149051	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High leverage bank dependent 
t-­‐Test:	  Two-­‐Sample	  Assuming	  Unequal	  Variances	  
	   	  
	   	   	  	  	   Variable	  1	   Variable	  2	  
Mean	   -­‐0,015881413	   -­‐0,008756573	  
Variance	   0,000338834	   0,000124605	  
Observations	   424	   424	  
Hypothesized	  Mean	  Difference	   0	  
	  df	   697	  
	  t	  Stat	   -­‐6,814936271	  
	  P(T<=t)	  one-­‐tail	   1,02133E-­‐11	  
	  t	  Critical	  one-­‐tail	   1,647042736	  
	  P(T<=t)	  two-­‐tail	   2,04265E-­‐11	  
	  t	  Critical	  two-­‐tail	   1,963373348	   	  
	   	   	  
	   	   	  
	  
Small bank dependent 
t-­‐Test:	  Two-­‐Sample	  Assuming	  Unequal	  Variances	  
	   	  
	   	   	  	  	   Variable	  1	   Variable	  2	  
Mean	   -­‐0,01229153	   -­‐0,007537562	  
Variance	   0,000325746	   9,87246E-­‐05	  
Observations	   316	   316	  
Hypothesized	  Mean	  Difference	   0	  
	  df	   490	  
	  t	  Stat	   -­‐4,101815196	  
	  P(T<=t)	  one-­‐tail	   2,39981E-­‐05	  
	  t	  Critical	  one-­‐tail	   1,647969283	  
	  P(T<=t)	  two-­‐tail	   4,79962E-­‐05	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t	  Critical	  two-­‐tail	   1,964817132	   	  	  
	  
 
Low leverage 
	   	  
	  
t-­‐Test:	  Two-­‐Sample	  Assuming	  Unequal	  Variances	  
	   	  
	   	   	  	  	   Variable	  1	   Variable	  2	  
Mean	   -­‐0,013035813	   -­‐0,010521464	  
Variance	   0,000750872	   0,001066712	  
Observations	   264	   264	  
Hypothesized	  Mean	  Difference	   0	  
	  df	   511	  
	  t	  Stat	   -­‐0,958253211	  
	  P(T<=t)	  one-­‐tail	   0,169194121	  
	  t	  Critical	  one-­‐tail	   1,647841009	  
	  P(T<=t)	  two-­‐tail	   0,338388242	  
	  t	  Critical	  two-­‐tail	   1,964617222	   	  
	   	   	  
	  
High cash 
t-­‐Test:	  Two-­‐Sample	  Assuming	  Unequal	  Variances	  
	   	  
	   	   	  	  	   Variable	  1	   Variable	  2	  
Mean	   -­‐0,011648397	   -­‐0,010484501	  
Variance	   0,000719942	   0,001227382	  
Observations	   188	   188	  
Hypothesized	  Mean	  Difference	   0	  
	  df	   350	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t	  Stat	   -­‐0,361638039	  
	  P(T<=t)	  one-­‐tail	   0,358920377	  
	  t	  Critical	  one-­‐tail	   1,64921887	  
	  P(T<=t)	  two-­‐tail	   0,717840754	  
	  t	  Critical	  two-­‐tail	   1,966765003	   	  
	   	   	  Equity issuance 
Whole sample 
 
High leverage 
 
t-­‐Test:	  Two-­‐Sample	  Assuming	  Unequal	  Variances
Variable	  1 Variable	  2
Mean 0,005518443 0,00512673
Variance 0,004783883 0,004255761
Observations 1793 1837
Hypothesized	  Mean	  Difference 0
df 3603
t	  Stat 0,175446593
P(T<=t)	  one-­‐tail 0,430369296
t	  Critical	  one-­‐tail 1,645276653
P(T<=t)	  two-­‐tail 0,860738592
t	  Critical	  two-­‐tail 1,960622618
t-­‐Test:	  Two-­‐Sample	  Assuming	  Unequal	  Variances
Variable	  1 Variable	  2
Mean 0,004711512 0,008445857
Variance 0,00610567 0,005703959
Observations 331 331
Hypothesized	  Mean	  Difference 0
df 659
t	  Stat -­‐0,6251875
P(T<=t)	  one-­‐tail 0,266032213
t	  Critical	  one-­‐tail 1,647169145
P(T<=t)	  two-­‐tail 0,532064425
t	  Critical	  two-­‐tail 1,963570297
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8.4.4 Paired t-Test 
Investment 
Whole sample 
t-­‐Test:	  Paired	  Two	  Sample	  for	  Means	  
	   	  
	   	   	  	  	   Variable	  1	   Variable	  2	  
Mean	   -­‐0,010380944	   -­‐0,014281336	  
Variance	   0,000138328	   0,000312633	  
Observations	   591	   591	  
Pearson	  Correlation	   0,654342478	  
	  Hypothesized	  Mean	  Difference	   0	  
	  df	   590	  
	  t	  Stat	   7,090943576	  
	  P(T<=t)	  one-­‐tail	   1,91196E-­‐12	  
	  t	  Critical	  one-­‐tail	   1,647440371	  
	  P(T<=t)	  two-­‐tail	   3,82391E-­‐12	  
	  t	  Critical	  two-­‐tail	   1,963992904	   	  
 
High leverage 
t-­‐Test:	  Paired	  Two	  Sample	  for	  Means	  
	   	  
	   	   	  	  	   Variable	  1	   Variable	  2	  
Mean	   -­‐0,010694413	   -­‐0,013521232	  
Variance	   0,00017689	   0,000256756	  
Observations	   111	   111	  
Pearson	  Correlation	   0,780803497	  
	  Hypothesized	  Mean	  Difference	   0	  
	  df	   110	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t	  Stat	   2,965726902	  
	  P(T<=t)	  one-­‐tail	   0,001852058	  
	  t	  Critical	  one-­‐tail	   1,658824187	  
	  P(T<=t)	  two-­‐tail	   0,003704115	  
	  t	  Critical	  two-­‐tail	   1,981765282	   	  
 
High leverage bank dependent 
t-­‐Test:	  Paired	  Two	  Sample	  for	  Means	  
	   	  
	   	   	  	  	   Variable	  1	   Variable	  2	  
Mean	   -­‐0,010503519	   -­‐0,013752761	  
Variance	   0,000172084	   0,000252577	  
Observations	   105	   105	  
Pearson	  Correlation	   0,779624629	  
	  Hypothesized	  Mean	  Difference	   0	  
	  df	   104	  
	  t	  Stat	   3,336385329	  
	  P(T<=t)	  one-­‐tail	   0,000588908	  
	  t	  Critical	  one-­‐tail	   1,659637437	  
	  P(T<=t)	  two-­‐tail	   0,001177817	  
	  t	  Critical	  two-­‐tail	   1,983037526	   	  
	   	   	  
	  
Small bank dependent 
t-­‐Test:	  Paired	  Two	  Sample	  for	  Means	  
	   	  
	   	   	  	  	   Variable	  1	   Variable	  2	  
Mean	   -­‐0,009426232	   -­‐0,014452334	  
Variance	   0,000132622	   0,00077461	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Observations	   79	   79	  
Pearson	  Correlation	   0,503282834	  
	  Hypothesized	  Mean	  Difference	   0	  
	  df	   78	  
	  t	  Stat	   1,847613227	  
	  P(T<=t)	  one-­‐tail	   0,034224797	  
	  t	  Critical	  one-­‐tail	   1,664624645	  
	  P(T<=t)	  two-­‐tail	   0,068449594	  
	  t	  Critical	  two-­‐tail	   1,990847069	   	  
	  
Low leverage 
t-­‐Test:	  Paired	  Two	  Sample	  for	  Means	  
	   	  
	   	   	  	  	   Variable	  1	   Variable	  2	  
Mean	   -­‐0,009501419	   -­‐0,012187821	  
Variance	   0,000211636	   0,000245418	  
Observations	   67	   67	  
Pearson	  Correlation	   0,809272237	  
	  Hypothesized	  Mean	  Difference	   0	  
	  df	   66	  
	  t	  Stat	   2,341597542	  
	  P(T<=t)	  one-­‐tail	   0,011114877	  
	  t	  Critical	  one-­‐tail	   1,668270514	  
	  P(T<=t)	  two-­‐tail	   0,022229755	  
	  t	  Critical	  two-­‐tail	   1,996564419	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High cash 
t-­‐Test:	  Paired	  Two	  Sample	  for	  Means	  
	   	  
	   	   	  	  	   Variable	  1	   Variable	  2	  
Mean	   -­‐0,008381434	   -­‐0,011130057	  
Variance	   0,000102572	   0,000158316	  
Observations	   47	   47	  
Pearson	  Correlation	   0,724989683	  
	  Hypothesized	  Mean	  Difference	   0	  
	  df	   46	  
	  t	  Stat	   2,159878236	  
	  P(T<=t)	  one-­‐tail	   0,018014361	  
	  t	  Critical	  one-­‐tail	   1,678660414	  
	  P(T<=t)	  two-­‐tail	   0,036028723	  
	  t	  Critical	  two-­‐tail	   2,012895599	   	  
 
  
 108 
 
8.5 Test for OLS assumptions 
8.5.1 Correlation matrix – independent variables 
Pre-crisis vs first year 
 
 DUMMY 
DUMMY_PR
EVSFIRST DGT 
DUMMY  1.000000 -2.75E-19  0.696490 
DUMMY_PR
EVSFIRST -2.75E-19  1.000000  0.172633 
DGT  0.696490  0.172633  1.000000 
 
Pre-crisis vs post-Lehman period 
 
 DGT 
DUMMYCO
MPANY 
DUMMY_PR
EVSLEHMA
N 
DGT  1.000000  0.561380  0.233572 
DUMMYCO
MPANY  0.561380  1.000000 -4.05E-18 
DUMMY_PR
EVSLEHMA
N  0.233572 -4.05E-18  1.000000 
 
Pre-crisis vs last year 
 DUMMY 
DUMMYPRE
VSLAST DGT 
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DUMMY  1.000000  0.000000  0.696509 
DUMMYPR
EVSLAST  0.000000  1.000000  0.172482 
DGT  0.696509  0.172482  1.000000 
 
 
 8.5.2 Correlation matrix – independent variables and the error term 
Pre-crisis vs first year 
 RESID01 DGT DUMMY 
DUMMY_PR
EVSFIRST 
RESID01  1.000000 -1.92E-16 -1.45E-16 -4.45E-16 
DGT -1.92E-16  1.000000  0.696490  0.172633 
DUMMY -1.45E-16  0.696490  1.000000 -9.29E-19 
DUMMY_PR
EVSFIRST -4.45E-16  0.172633 -9.29E-19  1.000000 
 
Pre-crisis vs post-Lehman period 
 DGT 
DUMMY_PR
EVSLEHMA
N 
DUMMYCO
MPANY RESID01 
DGT  1.000000  0.233572  0.561380 -1.34E-16 
DUMMY_PR
EVSLEHMA
N  0.233572  1.000000 -5.31E-18 -4.79E-16 
DUMMYCO
MPANY  0.561380 -5.31E-18  1.000000 -2.66E-16 
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RESID01 -1.34E-16 -4.79E-16 -2.66E-16  1.000000 
 
Pre-crisis vs last year 
 DGT DUMMY 
DUMMYPRE
VSLAST RESID01 
DGT  1.000000  0.696782  0.172429  2.89E-17 
DUMMY  0.696782  1.000000  0.000256  3.14E-17 
DUMMYPR
EVSLAST  0.172429  0.000256  1.000000  3.98E-17 
RESID01  2.89E-17  3.14E-17  3.98E-17  1.000000 
 
8.5.3 Test for heteroscedaticity 
Pre-crisis vs first year, cash holdings, low leverage 
Dependent Variable: RESIDSQ   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/22/14   Time: 13:28   
Sample: 2006Q3 2008Q2   
Periods included: 8   
Cross-sections included: 589   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 4712  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     DUMMY 0.014900 0.024116 0.617864 0.5367 
DGT 0.009677 0.034105 0.283741 0.7766 
DUMMY_PREVSFIRST -0.023319 0.018051 -1.291840 0.1965 
C 0.059029 0.012764 4.624708 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.000639    Mean dependent var 0.049883 
Adjusted R-squared 0.000002    S.D. dependent var 0.601346 
S.E. of regression 0.601345    Akaike info criterion 1.821553 
Sum squared resid 1702.488    Schwarz criterion 1.827035 
Log likelihood -4287.579    Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.823480 
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F-statistic 1.003169    Durbin-Watson stat 0.332968 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.390260    
     
     
	  
Pre-crisis vs post-Lehman, capital expenditures, high leverage firms 
Dependent Variable: RESIDSQ   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/22/14   Time: 13:48   
Sample: 2006Q3 2009Q1   
Periods included: 6   
Cross-sections included: 590   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 3540  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     DUMMY -5.88E-06 0.000110 -0.053246 0.9575 
DUMMY_PREVSLEHMA
N -0.000140 8.33E-05 -1.675160 0.0940 
DGT -1.22E-05 0.000191 -0.063680 0.9492 
C 0.000356 4.81E-05 7.397690 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.001016    Mean dependent var 0.000307 
Adjusted R-squared 0.000168    S.D. dependent var 0.002103 
S.E. of regression 0.002103    Akaike info criterion -9.489632 
Sum squared resid 0.015641    Schwarz criterion -9.482658 
Log likelihood 16800.65    Hannan-Quinn criter. -9.487144 
F-statistic 1.198521    Durbin-Watson stat 1.819394 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.308743    
     
      
Pre-crisis vs last year, capital expenditures, high leverage dependent 
Dependent Variable: RESIDSQ   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/22/14   Time: 13:50   
Sample: 2006Q3 2010Q1   
Periods included: 8   
Cross-sections included: 589   
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Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 4710  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     DUMMY -1.96E-05 0.000147 -0.133306 0.8940 
DUMMYPREVSLAST -9.32E-05 8.78E-05 -1.061436 0.2885 
DGT -0.000121 0.000208 -0.580966 0.5613 
C 0.000359 6.21E-05 5.774437 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.000639    Mean dependent var 0.000298 
Adjusted R-squared 0.000002    S.D. dependent var 0.002732 
S.E. of regression 0.002732    Akaike info criterion -8.966483 
Sum squared resid 0.035133    Schwarz criterion -8.960999 
Log likelihood 21120.07    Hannan-Quinn criter. -8.964555 
F-statistic 1.002773    Durbin-Watson stat 1.376868 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.390443    
     
      
 
8.5.4 Jarque-Bera Normality test 
Pre-crisis vs last year, high leverage investments 
0
400
800
1,200
1,600
2,000
2,400
2,800
3,200
-0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3
Series: Standardized Residuals
Sample 2006Q3 2010Q1
Observations 4718
Mean       1.74e-18
Median   0.004290
Maximum  0.295879
Minimum -0.326671
Std. Dev.   0.017247
Skewness  -3.771891
Kurtosis   85.28174
Jarque-Bera  1342112.
Probability  0.000000
 
 
 
 
 113 
 
Pre-crisis vs post-Lehman, Capital expenditures, High leverage bank dependent  
0
400
800
1,200
1,600
2,000
2,400
-0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.1
Series: Standardized Residuals
Sample 2006Q3 2009Q1
Observations 3540
Mean       1.46e-17
Median   0.004897
Maximum  0.111296
Minimum -0.326622
Std. Dev.   0.017538
Skewness  -3.988832
Kurtosis   47.76441
Jarque-Bera  304955.6
Probability  0.000000
 
 
 
 
 
